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	<title>Cognito | John Nessime</title>
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	<description>Cloud, DevOps, Data &#38; AI — Built, Tested, Explained</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 06:00:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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	<title>Cognito | John Nessime</title>
	<link>https://john-nessime.com/blog/tag/cognito/</link>
	<width>32</width>
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	<item>
		<title>Building a Secure Patient Document Portal on S3 and Cognito</title>
		<link>https://john-nessime.com/blog/cloud-computing/secure-patient-document-portal-s3-cognito/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[John Nessime]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 06:00:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cloud Computing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cloud Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amazon S3]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Audit Logging]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AWS KMS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bucket Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CloudTrail]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cognito]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Encryption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ePHI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Healthcare Cloud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HIPAA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IAM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Identity Pools]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Least Privilege]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MFA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PHI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Presigned URLs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Session Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Token Revocation]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://john-nessime.com/blog/?p=457</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Cognito for sign-in, S3 for the files, and a demo that passes on the first try. The problems start after that. Prefix isolation, presigned URL lifetimes, KMS as a second gate, CloudTrail data events, and token revocation that actually ends a session.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog/cloud-computing/secure-patient-document-portal-s3-cognito/">Building a Secure Patient Document Portal on S3 and Cognito</a> appeared first on <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog">John Nessime</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The request usually arrives sideways. A clinic manager says something like: &#8220;we&#8217;re emailing scans as PDF attachments and our insurer flagged it, can you build us something?&#8221; Nobody says the words &#8220;patient portal.&#8221; They say &#8220;somewhere for patients to pick up their files.&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So you sketch the obvious thing. Amazon Cognito for sign-in, Amazon S3 for the documents, a small front end in between. It&#8217;s three services and a weekend, and it works on the first try, which is exactly the problem. A <strong>secure patient document portal</strong> built this way passes every test you think to run, because the tests you think to run are all &#8220;can Alice download Alice&#8217;s file?&#8221; The one that matters is &#8220;what can Alice see about Bob?&#8221; and that one has an answer you won&#8217;t like.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This post covers the parts that go wrong after the demo. Where to put the authorization boundary, how to scope the S3 policy so one patient can&#8217;t enumerate another, why your download links expire earlier than you configured, what encryption actually gates, and what your audit trail looks like on the day someone asks for it. Everything here is mechanism, not a compliance checklist. Getting a Business Associate Agreement in place is a separate conversation with your lawyer and your AWS account team.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The failure that never pages you</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Here&#8217;s the shape of it. You write an IAM policy that lets a signed-in user read objects under their own prefix. Something like <code>arn:aws:s3:::clinic-docs/patients/${cognito-identity.amazonaws.com:sub}/*</code>. You test it. Alice gets her file. Alice cannot get Bob&#8217;s file. Ship it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Then, because the front end needs to render a file list, someone adds <code>s3:ListBucket</code>. And <code>s3:ListBucket</code> is not an object-level action. It applies to the bucket ARN, not the object ARN, so the <code>${cognito-identity.amazonaws.com:sub}</code> substitution in your resource string does nothing for it. Unless you add a separate condition on the request, a signed-in patient can list every key in the bucket.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">They still can&#8217;t download anything. Every <code>GetObject</code> outside their prefix returns a denial. But they can read the key names. And key names in a clinic bucket are rarely neutral. <code>patients/8f2a.../oncology-referral-2024.pdf</code> tells you something about a person even if the bytes stay locked.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nothing alerts on this. No error appears in any log you&#8217;re watching, because nothing errored. The listing succeeded. That&#8217;s the failure mode worth building around: in a document portal, the metadata leak is the one that doesn&#8217;t announce itself.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The fix is a condition key on the list action, not a resource string:</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code>{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "ListOwnPrefixOnly",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "s3:ListBucket",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::clinic-docs",
      "Condition": {
        "StringLike": {
          "s3:prefix": [
            "patients/${cognito-identity.amazonaws.com:sub}/*"
          ]
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "Sid": "ReadOwnObjectsOnly",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "s3:GetObject",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::clinic-docs/patients/${cognito-identity.amazonaws.com:sub}/*"
    }
  ]
}</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two statements, two different jobs. The first constrains what the caller may ask the bucket to enumerate. The second constrains what bytes the caller may pull. Write only the second one and you&#8217;ve secured the download path while leaving the discovery path wide open.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One trap in that variable. <code>${cognito-identity.amazonaws.com:sub}</code> resolves to the identity ID from the Cognito <em>identity pool</em>, not the <code>sub</code> claim from the user pool. They are different values for the same human. If you name your prefixes with the user pool sub because that&#8217;s what your application code has handy, the policy will match nothing and every request will be denied, which at least fails loudly.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Decide where the authorization boundary lives</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There are two honest architectures here and the choice shapes everything downstream. Pick deliberately.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Pattern A: browser holds AWS credentials</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The user signs in to a Cognito user pool. The application exchanges that token with a Cognito identity pool for temporary AWS credentials, and the browser calls S3 directly using the AWS SDK.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It&#8217;s less code and there&#8217;s no server to run. The authorization boundary is entirely the IAM role policy attached to the identity pool. That policy is the whole security model, so it had better be right, and it&#8217;s harder to reason about than application code because the enforcement happens in a service you can&#8217;t step through with a debugger.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The real limitation is expressiveness. IAM policy conditions do not know that Bob&#8217;s referral was superseded, that Alice revoked consent last Tuesday, or that a document should only be visible after a clinician releases it. Anything with business logic in it has to be encoded as prefix structure or object tags, and that gets brittle fast.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Pattern B: backend brokers every object</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The browser never touches AWS credentials. It sends the Cognito access token to your own API. The API validates the token, checks its own records for who may see what, and returns a presigned URL for that one object. S3 is reachable only by the API&#8217;s execution role.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">You now have a place to put logic, a place to log intent alongside access, and a single choke point to rate limit. The cost is that you own a service, its uptime, and its dependencies.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For a small clinic build, this is the one I reach for first. Not because Pattern A is insecure, but because the questions clients ask in month three (&#8220;can we hide results until the doctor reviews them?&#8221;) are answerable in Pattern B and require a re-architecture in Pattern A. The identity-pool approach earns its keep when access really is a pure function of who you are, which in healthcare it rarely stays.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If you do want attribute-driven access without a backend, Cognito identity pools can map claims from the token onto principal tags on the temporary session, which you then reference in policy conditions. It works, and it is the right tool for coarse distinctions like patient versus staff. It is not the right tool for per-document consent state.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Your download links expire before you think they do</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This one generates support tickets on week two. You set a presigned URL to last a few hours. Patients report links dying in under one. Nothing in your code changed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A presigned URL carries a signature made with whatever credentials signed it, and it cannot outlive those credentials. AWS documents the ceilings clearly: with long-lived IAM user keys and Signature Version 4 the maximum is seven days; from the S3 console the range is one minute to twelve hours; with temporary credentials from an assumed role, the URL dies when the role session does, regardless of the expiry you asked for. A default <code>AssumeRole</code> session is one hour.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Your Lambda or container signing those URLs is using temporary credentials. So the effective lifetime is the shorter of your requested expiry and the remaining time on that role session, and the remaining time depends on when the runtime last refreshed. That&#8217;s the source of the flapping. You can watch it yourself:</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code># Sign a URL and inspect what was actually encoded into it.
aws s3 presign s3://clinic-docs/patients/example/scan.pdf --expires-in 3600

# The returned URL contains X-Amz-Date, X-Amz-Expires and X-Amz-Credential.
# X-Amz-Expires is the window you asked for. If X-Amz-Credential shows an
# ASIA... key id, you signed with temporary credentials and the real ceiling
# is the session, not the window.</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The honest resolution is to stop fighting it. Sign short, on demand, when the user clicks. Fifteen minutes is generous for a download the patient is standing in front of. Long links are not a convenience feature in this context anyway, because a presigned URL is a bearer credential: whoever holds the string can fetch the object, signed in or not. Forwarding the email forwards the access. If your portal mails links, you have moved the authorization boundary into someone&#8217;s inbox.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mail a notification that says a document is ready and link to the portal login. Never mail the signed URL itself.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Encryption that actually gates something</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">New S3 objects are encrypted at rest by default with S3-managed keys. That satisfies the sentence &#8220;data is encrypted at rest&#8221; and gates precisely nothing, because anyone with <code>s3:GetObject</code> gets plaintext back. It is a storage property, not an access control.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Server-side encryption with an AWS KMS customer managed key is different in kind. Reading an object now requires two independent grants: the S3 permission and <code>kms:Decrypt</code> on the key. Those live in different policies and can be owned by different people. A bucket policy mistake no longer hands over plaintext on its own, and revoking the key grant cuts off reads without touching a single S3 permission.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">You also get a second audit stream. Every decrypt is a KMS API call, recorded separately from the S3 call, which is useful precisely because an attacker who tampers with one trail probably didn&#8217;t think about the other.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The costs are real and worth stating. KMS charges per request, so a portal that fetches many small objects will notice. S3 Bucket Keys reduce that request volume substantially by caching a bucket-level key, at the price of coarser detail in the KMS audit records. For a document portal with modest traffic and high sensitivity, I&#8217;d take the per-request cost and keep the granularity. For a thumbnail-heavy application, the opposite.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The audit trail you don&#8217;t have yet</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Assume someone will eventually ask: who downloaded this specific file, and when? If you have not explicitly turned something on, the answer is that you don&#8217;t know.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">CloudTrail is on for management events by default, and management events are control-plane operations: creating the bucket, changing its policy, attaching a role. Object-level reads and writes are <em>data events</em>, and data events are off by default because of volume and cost. <code>GetObject</code> on a patient scan is a data event. Unless you configured a trail with data events for that bucket, no record of the download exists.</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code># Log S3 object-level activity for one bucket on an existing trail.
# Advanced event selectors let you scope to a single bucket prefix rather
# than every object in the account.
aws cloudtrail put-event-selectors 
  --trail-name clinic-audit-trail 
  --advanced-event-selectors '[
    {
      "Name": "PHI bucket object access",
      "FieldSelectors": [
        {"Field": "eventCategory", "Equals": ["Data"]},
        {"Field": "resources.type", "Equals": ["AWS::S3::Object"]},
        {"Field": "resources.ARN", "StartsWith":
          ["arn:aws:s3:::clinic-docs/patients/"]}
      ]
    }
  ]'</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">S3 server access logs are the other option and they are not equivalent. They record HTTP-level request detail and are delivered on a best-effort basis with no delivery guarantee, which makes them useful for traffic analysis and weak as evidence. CloudTrail data events carry caller identity, which is the field you actually need when the question is &#8220;who.&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two things to sort out while you&#8217;re in there. Send the trail to a bucket in a different account, or at minimum a bucket the portal&#8217;s roles cannot write to, so that compromising the application doesn&#8217;t compromise its own log. And put a lifecycle rule on the log bucket, because data event volume grows with usage and nobody budgets for it. If you already run centralized dashboards on something like Grafana Cloud or CloudWatch, wire an alert to unusual read volume per identity now rather than after the incident.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Cutting off access when someone leaves</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Disabling a Cognito user does not immediately end their session, and this surprises people. Tokens are self-contained. An access token already in a browser stays cryptographically valid until it expires, typically about an hour.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Refresh tokens are the longer exposure. The default is thirty days, and app clients can be configured anywhere from sixty minutes to ten years. Ten-year refresh tokens on a portal holding medical records is not a hypothetical misconfiguration; it&#8217;s a checkbox someone ticked to stop users complaining about re-login.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cognito gives you revocation. Token revocation is enabled by default on newly created app clients. <code>AdminUserGlobalSignOut</code> revokes all of a user&#8217;s refresh, ID, and access tokens from the server side, and the <code>/oauth2/revoke</code> endpoint kills one refresh token and everything descended from it.</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code># Server-side, authorized with IAM credentials. Revokes the user's refresh,
# ID and access tokens.
aws cognito-idp admin-user-global-sign-out 
  --user-pool-id us-east-1_EXAMPLE 
  --username patient-example

# Confirm revocation is switched on for the app client before you rely on it.
aws cognito-idp describe-user-pool-client 
  --user-pool-id us-east-1_EXAMPLE 
  --client-id EXAMPLECLIENTID 
  --query 'UserPoolClient.EnableTokenRevocation'</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Now the part that catches teams out. AWS documents that a revoked token still passes verification in a generic JWT library that only checks signature and expiry. Revocation is enforced by Cognito, not baked into the token. If your API validates tokens by fetching the JWKS and calling a verify function, a revoked token sails straight through until it expires on its own.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Which means short access token lifetimes are load-bearing. Revocation shortens the tail; it doesn&#8217;t close the window. Refresh token rotation, available on the Essentials and Plus feature tiers, replaces the refresh token on each exchange and narrows the window a stolen one is useful for. If you&#8217;re paying for Plus for threat protection features, you already have it.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Troubleshooting the usual suspects</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Every request returns access denied after login</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nine times out of ten the prefix in your policy variable doesn&#8217;t match the prefix in your bucket. Print the identity ID your session actually resolved to and compare it character by character against a real key. Remember the identity pool ID and the user pool sub are different values.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Signature does not match on a presigned URL</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Usually something modified the request after signing. A client library adding a header, a proxy rewriting the path, or an email gateway URL-encoding the query string. Compare the <code>X-Amz-SignedHeaders</code> list in the URL against what the client actually sent.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Uploads succeed but downloads fail</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Check the KMS key policy separately from the IAM policy. A role can hold <code>kms:GenerateDataKey</code> (enough to write) without <code>kms:Decrypt</code> (needed to read). The S3 error will not say the word KMS prominently, which is why this one burns an afternoon.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Browser uploads fail before any request reaches S3</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That&#8217;s CORS. The bucket needs a CORS configuration allowing your portal&#8217;s origin, the methods you use, and any headers the SDK sends. Browser preflight failures never appear in S3 logs, so check the browser console first.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Nothing appears in CloudTrail</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Data events are not shown in CloudTrail Event History. Query the destination bucket directly, with Athena or CloudTrail Lake, and allow a few minutes for delivery.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Common mistakes</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Granting <code>s3:ListBucket</code> without an <code>s3:prefix</code> condition, so patients can enumerate every key even though downloads are blocked.</li>

<li>Putting identifying information in object keys or file names. Assume the key will leak eventually and use opaque identifiers.</li>

<li>Emailing presigned URLs. The link is the credential, and inboxes get forwarded, backed up, and breached.</li>

<li>Extending refresh token lifetime to silence complaints about re-login, instead of implementing rotation.</li>

<li>Assuming default encryption means access control. It means the disk is encrypted, nothing more.</li>

<li>Enabling versioning without a lifecycle rule, so deleted documents linger indefinitely as noncurrent versions you forgot exist.</li>

<li>Skipping CloudTrail data events to save money, then discovering the gap during an access review.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Best practices for a secure patient document portal</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Keep one bucket for patient documents and nothing else. Mixed-purpose buckets make policies ambiguous and audits slow.</li>

<li>Turn on S3 Block Public Access at the account level, not just the bucket. Account level survives someone creating a new bucket in a hurry.</li>

<li>Enable versioning and set a noncurrent version expiration rule, so an overwritten document is recoverable but not permanent.</li>

<li>Use a KMS customer managed key so decrypt authority is separable from S3 authority.</li>

<li>Require MFA for staff accounts. TOTP costs nothing to enable and staff accounts are the ones with breadth.</li>

<li>Sign download URLs on demand with short expiry, and always from a backend that logged why it signed.</li>

<li>Put the portal behind a WAF and rate limiting. Cloudflare in front of the application, or AWS WAF on the distribution, both work; the point is that credential stuffing against a login page is the most likely thing to actually happen to you.</li>

<li>Restrict administrative access to the AWS console and to any bastion by network as well as identity, whether that&#8217;s IAM Identity Center with condition keys or a VPN such as NordVPN or Surfshark for a small team without central identity.</li>

<li>Write down the retention period before launch, then encode it as a lifecycle rule. Retention decided later is retention never decided.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Frequently asked questions</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Are S3 and Cognito enough for HIPAA compliance?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both are covered under AWS&#8217;s HIPAA eligibility program, and Cognito&#8217;s documentation states it is HIPAA-BAA eligible. That makes them usable building blocks, not compliance. You need a signed Business Associate Agreement with AWS, and the configuration, access reviews, training, and documented policies remain yours. Service eligibility is a prerequisite, not an outcome.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Should I use a Cognito identity pool or a backend API?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Use an identity pool when access is a pure function of identity and the rules will not change. Use a backend when documents have states, when a clinician gates release, or when you need to log intent alongside access. Most clinic portals become the second within a year.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">How long should a presigned URL last?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Minutes, not hours. Sign at click time. The maximum with long-lived credentials is seven days, but that ceiling is irrelevant here because the link is a bearer credential and a longer window is a longer leak.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Can patients upload documents back to the portal?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yes, using presigned PUT or presigned POST. Presigned POST is worth knowing about because its policy document can constrain content type and size before the object lands, which presigned PUT cannot. Either way, write uploads into a quarantine prefix, scan them, then move them.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Does enabling CloudTrail data events cost much?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Data events are billed per event recorded with no free tier, unlike management events. For a portal serving a few thousand downloads a month the amount is small; for a bucket also serving application assets it is not. Scope your event selector to the patient prefix rather than the whole account and the question mostly goes away.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What happens to sessions when I disable a user?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nothing immediate. Existing access tokens remain valid until they expire. Call <code>AdminUserGlobalSignOut</code> to revoke tokens, and keep access token lifetime short so the residual window is measured in minutes.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Do I need CloudFront in front of the bucket?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Not for correctness. It helps when patients are geographically spread, when you want signed cookies for a set of objects rather than one URL per object, or when you want a single edge to attach a WAF to. For a single-clinic portal, direct presigned URLs are simpler and one fewer thing to misconfigure.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The one thing to remember</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A signed-in token proves who someone is. It does not decide what they may reach. In a <strong>secure patient document portal</strong> the boundary is the policy condition, the KMS grant, and the code that decides whether to sign a URL at all, and every one of those is something you have to write on purpose.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The demo passes either way. The difference only shows up when someone reads a key name they shouldn&#8217;t have seen, and nothing in your system considers that an error.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If you build one of these, spend an hour before launch on exactly two things: sign in as a test patient and try to list the bucket, then ask your logs who downloaded a specific file last week. If either answer is uncomfortable, you&#8217;ve found your next task.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Need a second pair of eyes on your portal?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is the kind of build where the gap between working and safe is invisible from the outside. I help small teams close it.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Reviewing S3 bucket policies and Cognito identity pool roles for prefix isolation gaps, including the list-versus-get split most policies miss.</li>

<li>Designing the boundary: identity pool credentials in the browser versus a backend that brokers presigned URLs, with the trade-offs written down for your stakeholders.</li>

<li>Setting up KMS customer managed keys, key policies, and grant separation so decrypt authority is not implied by storage authority.</li>

<li>Turning on scoped CloudTrail data events, building the Athena tables to query them, and alerting on abnormal per-identity read volume.</li>

<li>Hardening the Cognito side: MFA, token lifetimes, refresh token rotation, and a revocation path that actually ends sessions.</li>

<li>Writing the whole thing as Terraform or OpenTofu so the next change is a reviewed pull request rather than a console click.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Send me your bucket policy and your identity pool role, with the account IDs redacted, and I&#8217;ll tell you what a signed-in patient can actually see.</p>



<div class="wp-block-buttons is-layout-flex wp-block-buttons-is-layout-flex">
<div class="wp-block-button"><a class="wp-block-button__link wp-element-button" href="https://www.upwork.com/freelancers/~01f15a912ad84a6620" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Work with me on Upwork</a></div>
</div>
<p>The post <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog/cloud-computing/secure-patient-document-portal-s3-cognito/">Building a Secure Patient Document Portal on S3 and Cognito</a> appeared first on <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog">John Nessime</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Tenant Isolation on AWS: Building a Multi-Tenant Workshop Platform That Doesn&#8217;t Leak</title>
		<link>https://john-nessime.com/blog/cloud-computing/tenant-isolation-aws-multi-tenant-saas/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[John Nessime]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cloud Computing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cloud Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SaaS Engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ABAC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amazon Aurora]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amazon S3]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AWS STS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cognito]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cost Allocation Tags]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DynamoDB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IAM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Least Privilege]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Multi-Tenant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Noisy Neighbor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pool Model]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Row-Level Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SaaS Architecture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Session Policies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Silo Model]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tenant Isolation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tenant Onboarding]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Token Vending Machine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Workshop Management]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://john-nessime.com/blog/?p=538</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A missing tenant filter doesn't throw an error, it returns a 200 with too many rows. This is how to build a multi-tenant workshop management platform on AWS where the isolation boundary sits below your application code: STS session tags feeding IAM conditions, DynamoDB leading keys, scoped S3 prefixes, forced PostgreSQL row-level security, and a control plane that verifies each new tenant is fenced before anyone logs in.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog/cloud-computing/tenant-isolation-aws-multi-tenant-saas/">Tenant Isolation on AWS: Building a Multi-Tenant Workshop Platform That Doesn&#8217;t Leak</a> appeared first on <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog">John Nessime</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A ticket comes in from one of the workshops on the platform. A service advisor pulled the weekly job report and there&#8217;s a vehicle on it that never came through their door. Wrong registration, wrong customer, wrong shop.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By the time that ticket lands, the leak already happened. You can patch the query in an hour. What you cannot do is tell the affected garage how many other reports were wrong, how long it had been wrong, or whether anyone downloaded a CSV. There&#8217;s no log that answers those questions, because nothing ever denied anything. The database happily returned the rows. The API happily serialised them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That&#8217;s the shape of the problem. Tenant isolation on AWS is not really about writing careful code. It&#8217;s about arranging things so that careless code fails loudly instead of quietly returning somebody else&#8217;s data.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This post walks through building a multi-tenant workshop management platform on AWS with isolation baked in from the first commit: where tenant context comes from, how the boundary changes shape per storage service, what the control plane has to own, and how you prove any of it works. The example is a shop management system, with job cards, vehicle histories, parts inventory and technician timesheets, but the patterns apply to any vertical SaaS product where one customer&#8217;s records must never touch another&#8217;s.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The failure mode that stays invisible</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Most multi-tenant systems start with a <code>tenant_id</code> column and a convention: every query filters on it. That works right up until it doesn&#8217;t.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The convention breaks in ordinary ways. Someone adds a reporting endpoint and copies a query from a script that ran as an admin. A new join pulls in a table nobody remembered to filter. An ORM lazy-loads a relationship and the filter lives on the parent, not the child. A background job that recalculates parts margins runs without any tenant in scope at all, because it processes everything.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">None of these throw. That&#8217;s the whole issue. A missing authorisation check produces a 403 you&#8217;ll notice in staging. A missing tenant filter produces a 200 with too many rows, and 200s don&#8217;t page anyone.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The fix is not more discipline. It&#8217;s moving the filter somewhere the application cannot forget it: into IAM, into the database engine, or both. AWS makes this point directly in its own SaaS guidance, and it&#8217;s the right one. If your only defence against cross-tenant reads is that developers remember, you don&#8217;t have a defence, you have a habit.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Pick the isolation model before you write code</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There are three shapes, and they&#8217;re usually described as pool, silo and bridge.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Pool.</strong> Every tenant shares the same tables, buckets and compute. Cheapest to run, cheapest to deploy, and the model where isolation has to be enforced explicitly because nothing physical separates anyone.</li>



<li><strong>Silo.</strong> Each tenant gets dedicated resources: its own database, its own bucket, sometimes its own account. Isolation is close to free, operations are not. Migrations, deploys and monitoring all multiply by tenant count.</li>



<li><strong>Bridge.</strong> Mixed. Shared compute, dedicated storage, or pooled for the standard tier and siloed for the enterprise tier that asked hard questions in procurement.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For a workshop platform, most independent garages will be small, and pooling is the only sane starting point. The trap is treating that as permanent. Sooner or later a dealer group with forty sites will ask for a dedicated database, and if you have not left room for a per-tenant routing decision, retrofitting it means rewriting your data access layer.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What I&#8217;d actually do: build pooled, but put the storage target behind a resolver from day one. A function that takes a tenant ID and returns a connection, a table name or a bucket prefix. When the first silo tenant arrives, you change the resolver, not four hundred call sites.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Where tenant context comes from</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is the part people get subtly wrong, and it undermines everything downstream. The tenant identifier must come from the authenticated identity, never from the request. Not a header, not a query parameter, not a field in the JSON body. If a client can influence the tenant ID, your isolation model is decoration.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In practice that means a custom claim in the token your identity provider issues. Amazon Cognito can carry a custom attribute for this, and so can any external IdP you federate with. The API layer reads the claim, and from that point the tenant is a fact about the caller rather than an input to the call.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Then you push that fact down into AWS itself using a session tag. When your service assumes a role, it attaches the tenant as a tag on the session. Every subsequent AWS API call made with those credentials carries the tag in the request context, where IAM policies can reference it as <code>aws:PrincipalTag</code>.</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code>import boto3

def scoped_session(tenant_id, role_arn):
    sts = boto3.client("sts")
    resp = sts.assume_role(
        RoleArn=role_arn,
        RoleSessionName=f"workshop-{tenant_id}",
        Tags=[{"Key": "TenantID", "Value": tenant_id}],
    )
    c = resp["Credentials"]
    return boto3.Session(
        aws_access_key_id=c["AccessKeyId"],
        aws_secret_access_key=c["SecretAccessKey"],
        aws_session_token=c["SessionToken"],
    )</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two things make this work, and both are easy to miss. The role&#8217;s trust policy has to allow <code>sts:TagSession</code> alongside the assume-role action, or the call fails. And the calling principal needs permission to pass that tag. Get either wrong and you&#8217;ll spend an afternoon reading an error that sounds like it&#8217;s about the role rather than the tag.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One session tag, one role, one policy. That&#8217;s attribute-based access control, and it&#8217;s the reason ABAC scales where a role per tenant does not. Roles are a finite resource in an AWS account. Tags are not.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Tenant isolation on AWS changes shape per service</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is no single isolation control. Each service exposes a different lever, and you have to learn every one your architecture touches.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">DynamoDB: the partition key is the boundary</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If job cards live in DynamoDB with the tenant ID as the partition key, IAM can pin every read and write to that key. The condition key is <code>dynamodb:LeadingKeys</code>.</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code>{
  "Effect": "Allow",
  "Action": [
    "dynamodb:GetItem",
    "dynamodb:PutItem",
    "dynamodb:UpdateItem",
    "dynamodb:Query"
  ],
  "Resource": "arn:aws:dynamodb:REGION:ACCOUNT:table/JobCards",
  "Condition": {
    "ForAllValues:StringEquals": {
      "dynamodb:LeadingKeys": ["${aws:PrincipalTag/TenantID}"]
    }
  }
}</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Now a Query that omits the tenant partition key doesn&#8217;t return other tenants&#8217; job cards. It gets denied. That&#8217;s the behaviour you want: loud, logged, and impossible to miss in CloudTrail.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two caveats worth knowing before you commit. Scan operations don&#8217;t have a leading key to constrain, so granting <code>dynamodb:Scan</code> alongside this condition undermines the whole arrangement. And global secondary indexes have their own key structure, so an index whose partition key isn&#8217;t the tenant needs separate thought. Design the access patterns so that no query ever needs to look across tenants, and this stops being a problem.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">S3: two surfaces, not one</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Vehicle photos, inspection PDFs and signed job sheets go to S3 under a per-tenant prefix. The mistake is scoping only the object actions and leaving <code>ListBucket</code> open, which lets a tenant enumerate every other garage&#8217;s filenames even without reading them. Filenames leak plenty: customer names, registration plates, invoice numbers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Object actions are scoped through the resource ARN. Listing is scoped through the <code>s3:prefix</code> request condition. You need both statements, because they protect different operations.</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code>[
  {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": "s3:ListBucket",
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::workshop-tenant-files",
    "Condition": {
      "StringLike": {
        "s3:prefix": ["${aws:PrincipalTag/TenantID}/*"]
      }
    }
  },
  {
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Action": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"],
    "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::workshop-tenant-files/${aws:PrincipalTag/TenantID}/*"
  }
]</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The policy variable in the resource ARN is doing real work there. One policy, every tenant, no template rendering at request time.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Aurora PostgreSQL: row-level security, and the trap in it</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Relational data is where most workshop platforms actually live, because job cards, parts lines and labour rates are relational. IAM cannot see inside a table, so the boundary moves into PostgreSQL itself via row-level security.</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code>ALTER TABLE job_cards ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE job_cards FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

CREATE POLICY tenant_isolation ON job_cards
  USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
  WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><code>USING</code> controls which rows are visible to reads, updates and deletes. <code>WITH CHECK</code> controls what can be written. Without the second clause, a tenant can read only its own rows but insert a row stamped with someone else&#8217;s tenant ID. The first protects the read path, the second protects the write path, and you want both.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Now the trap, and it&#8217;s the one that gives teams false confidence. PostgreSQL superusers and roles carrying <code>BYPASSRLS</code> ignore row security entirely, and by default so does the table owner. If your application connects as the same role that ran the migrations, your policies are not in effect and your tests pass anyway. That&#8217;s why <code>FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY</code> is in the snippet above, and why the application should connect as a dedicated non-owner, non-superuser role.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second trap is connection reuse. Set the tenant with <code>SET LOCAL</code> inside a transaction, or with <code>set_config</code> using the transaction-local flag. Plain <code>SET</code> persists for the life of the connection, and a pooled connection outlives the request. That&#8217;s how one garage&#8217;s context ends up serving the next garage&#8217;s query.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Test row-level security as the application role, against a pooled connection, with at least two tenants in the table. Testing as the owner tells you nothing.</p>
</blockquote>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Compute isolation is a different question</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Data isolation stops one tenant reading another&#8217;s records. It does nothing about one tenant consuming everyone&#8217;s capacity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Workshop platforms have a specific version of this. End of month, every garage runs its invoicing and MOT reminder batch at roughly the same time. A dealer group importing three years of service history will happily saturate a shared worker pool while forty independents wait for their job cards to load.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Levers worth knowing, roughly in order of how much they cost you:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>API Gateway usage plans, keyed per tenant, to cap request rates at the edge before anything expensive runs.</li>



<li>Separate queues, or at minimum separate consumer concurrency, for bulk imports versus interactive requests. Bulk work should never share a lane with a screen someone is waiting on.</li>



<li>Reserved or provisioned concurrency on the Lambda functions serving interactive paths, so a batch surge cannot starve them.</li>



<li>Dedicated compute for premium tenants. This is silo by another name, and it&#8217;s the honest answer when a customer&#8217;s load profile genuinely doesn&#8217;t fit the pool.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Be honest with yourself about which problem you&#8217;re solving. Throttling is not isolation. It limits blast radius, it doesn&#8217;t create a boundary.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What the control plane has to own</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Separate the control plane from the application plane early. The control plane manages tenants; the application plane serves them. Mixing the two is how a bug in the onboarding flow ends up with production credentials.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Onboarding a new workshop is a sequence, and it should be a single idempotent workflow rather than a checklist someone follows:</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Generate a non-guessable tenant identifier. Lowercase alphanumeric, no customer name in it, because it will end up inside resource ARNs and key prefixes.</li>



<li>Write the tenant record: tier, isolation model, storage target, status.</li>



<li>Provision identity. User pool group or IdP mapping, with the tenant claim wired in.</li>



<li>Provision storage. For a pooled tenant that&#8217;s a prefix and a seeded row. For a siloed one it&#8217;s real infrastructure, which is why this step must be asynchronous.</li>



<li>Apply tags used for cost allocation and reporting.</li>



<li>Run a verification step that proves the new tenant can reach its own data and cannot reach a canary tenant&#8217;s data.</li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Step six is the one teams skip. It&#8217;s also the only step that tells you the previous five worked.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On per-tenant cost: activated cost allocation tags attribute anything that is a distinct tagged resource, which covers siloed tenants nicely. Pooled resources will not split by themselves, because a shared table doesn&#8217;t know which garage caused which read. If you need per-tenant margin, emit consumption as a metric dimension from the application: request counts, storage bytes, document pages processed. Tools like Vantage or CloudZero can allocate shared spend afterwards, but only from the signal you produce. Nothing recovers attribution you never recorded.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The AWS SaaS Builder Toolkit is worth a look here. It codifies control plane concepts as CDK constructs and will save you real time on onboarding plumbing. Read its own guidance first: the project describes itself as sample code, and expects you to review security fit before production. That&#8217;s a fair description rather than a warning label, but treat it as a starting point, not a finished platform.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Proving isolation actually holds</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An isolation model you haven&#8217;t tried to break is a design document, not a control.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The tests that earn their keep are negative ones. Seed two tenants. Authenticate as the first. Then deliberately do the wrong thing: request the second tenant&#8217;s job card by ID, list the second tenant&#8217;s S3 prefix, run a query with the session variable set to the wrong value. Every one of those should fail, and the test should assert on the failure.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Run the cross-tenant suite on every pull request, not nightly. It&#8217;s the regression that matters most and the one most likely to be introduced by an innocent refactor.</li>



<li>Use the IAM policy simulator to check a policy change before it ships, particularly when someone widens a resource ARN.</li>



<li>Turn on IAM Access Analyzer so external access grants surface without anyone having to notice them.</li>



<li>Audit the database on a schedule: tables with RLS enabled but no policy attached, tables missing FORCE, application roles that have quietly acquired ownership or BYPASSRLS during an incident.</li>



<li>Alert on AccessDenied volume per tenant. A spike is either a bug you introduced or someone probing, and both are worth knowing about.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Keep a permanent canary tenant in every environment, including production, holding nothing but synthetic data. Every negative test targets it. It costs almost nothing and it means your isolation tests never need real customer records.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Troubleshooting the failures you&#8217;ll actually hit</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">AccessDenied on a policy that looks correct</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Almost always the session tag isn&#8217;t present. If the tag is missing from the request context, the condition can&#8217;t match and the statement doesn&#8217;t apply. Call <code>sts:GetCallerIdentity</code> with the scoped credentials and confirm you&#8217;re on the assumed role you think you are, then check CloudTrail for the AssumeRole event and look at whether the tag was actually passed. Tag keys are case sensitive, and <code>TenantId</code> is not <code>TenantID</code>.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Queries return zero rows instead of the right rows</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Classic RLS symptom. The session variable is unset, so the policy predicate compares against null and nothing matches. Check <code>current_setting</code> inside the same transaction as the query, not in a separate connection from your SQL client. Empty results are the safe failure here, which is exactly why they&#8217;re easy to misread as a data problem.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">One tenant intermittently sees another&#8217;s data</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Intermittent means state reuse. Look at connection pooling first, then at any per-request context stored in thread-local or async-local storage that isn&#8217;t reset when the request finishes. If you&#8217;re using a proxy in front of the database, understand how it handles session state, because some proxies pin a connection to a client once session-level settings are detected, which changes the behaviour you tested against.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Isolation works in the API but not in background jobs</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Because the job has no request, so it has no token, so it has no tenant. Whatever runs asynchronously needs the tenant carried on the message and a session assumed per tenant when the work is processed. A worker that loops over all tenants with admin credentials is the single most common place isolation quietly stops applying.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Session tags don&#8217;t survive a second AssumeRole</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Session tags are not automatically carried forward when you chain roles unless they were marked transitive. If your architecture hops through more than one role, this is where the tenant context evaporates. Flatten the chain if you can; if you can&#8217;t, mark the tag transitive deliberately and document why.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Common mistakes</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Taking the tenant ID from a request header or body instead of the authenticated token.</li>



<li>Using the customer&#8217;s name or a sequential integer as the tenant identifier, then putting it in bucket prefixes where it becomes both guessable and enumerable.</li>



<li>Scoping S3 object actions but leaving bucket listing wide open.</li>



<li>Running the application as the PostgreSQL table owner, so RLS is enabled and silently inert.</li>



<li>Writing a USING clause with no WITH CHECK, leaving the write path open.</li>



<li>Creating one IAM role per tenant and discovering the account ceiling somewhere around the point the business gets interesting.</li>



<li>Assuming cost allocation tags will attribute pooled spend. They won&#8217;t, and by the time you need the numbers the history is gone.</li>



<li>Testing isolation only through the UI, where the frontend is already sending the right tenant every time.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Best practices worth the effort</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Derive tenant context from the token, propagate it as a session tag, and never let application code choose it.</li>



<li>Enforce the boundary at the layer below your code: IAM conditions for AWS resources, RLS for relational rows.</li>



<li>Put storage targets behind a resolver so moving a tenant from pool to silo is a configuration change.</li>



<li>Make onboarding one idempotent workflow that ends in a verification step.</li>



<li>Emit tenant as a dimension on logs and metrics from the start, so cost and performance questions stay answerable.</li>



<li>Keep a canary tenant and run cross-tenant negative tests in CI on every change.</li>



<li>Put a WAF or edge layer such as Cloudflare in front of tenant subdomains, and keep tenant routing decisions out of the origin application where you can.</li>
</ul>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Frequently asked questions</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Is a shared database with a tenant_id column ever acceptable?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yes, provided the column is enforced by the engine rather than by convention. A shared table with row-level security, forced, queried by a non-owner role, is a real boundary. A shared table where every query is expected to include the filter is not. The schema is the same; the guarantee is completely different.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">ABAC or dynamically generated IAM policies?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">ABAC for most cases. One role, one policy, tenant supplied per session, and nothing grows as you add customers. Dynamic policy generation, sometimes called a token vending machine, earns its place when a single policy genuinely cannot express the rule, such as when per-tenant resource names have to be injected rather than a key prefix. The cost is that you now own the correctness of a policy generator, plus per-request latency, and session policies have a size ceiling you can hit.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Should each tenant get its own AWS account?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It&#8217;s the strongest boundary available and the most expensive to operate. For a workshop platform serving independent garages it&#8217;s overkill. It becomes reasonable when a customer&#8217;s contract, regulator or data residency requirement makes shared infrastructure a non-starter, and at that point you&#8217;re pricing it as a premium tier rather than absorbing it.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">How do I handle a user who works at two workshops?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Model it as one identity with multiple tenant memberships and an explicit active tenant per session, rather than a token carrying a list. The active tenant becomes the session tag. Switching workshops means a new session, which is exactly the behaviour you want because it makes the switch visible in your audit trail.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Does row-level security hurt query performance?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It adds a predicate the planner has to satisfy, so the answer depends on your indexes. Index the tenant column, and index it as the leading column of composite indexes that support your common filters. Compare plans as the application role before and after enabling policies, because a plan captured as the owner may not reflect what the application actually runs.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Where does application-level authorisation fit?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alongside, not instead. Tenant isolation answers &#8220;which organisation&#8217;s data is this&#8221;. Authorisation answers &#8220;may this technician void an invoice&#8221;. Different questions, different layers. A policy engine such as Amazon Verified Permissions handles the second cleanly, and keeping them separate stops role logic creeping into your isolation boundary.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Can I retrofit isolation onto a platform that already has tenants?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">You can, and it&#8217;s tedious rather than impossible. Enforce at the database first, because that&#8217;s where the leak actually happens: table by table, FORCE enabled, application moved to a non-owner role. Then move the tenant ID out of request payloads and into the token. Add IAM conditions last, since they&#8217;re the least likely source of a live leak. Expect to find at least one background job with no tenant scope at all.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The one thing to remember</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Tenant isolation on AWS works when the boundary sits below your application code, in a layer that denies rather than trusts. IAM conditions on session tags for AWS resources, forced row-level security for relational data, and a control plane that verifies a new tenant is properly fenced before anyone logs in.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Retrofitting that onto a running multi-tenant platform is possible but grim, because you&#8217;re doing it while real workshops have real data in the system. Doing it on day one costs a week. That&#8217;s the entire trade, and it&#8217;s not a close call.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Need a second pair of eyes on your multi-tenant architecture?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Most of the isolation problems I see are not exotic. They&#8217;re a missing WITH CHECK clause, an application connecting as the table owner, or a background job nobody scoped. Things I can help with:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Reviewing an existing multi-tenant design and finding where the boundary is enforced by convention rather than by the platform.</li>



<li>Implementing ABAC with STS session tags across DynamoDB, S3 and Aurora, including the trust policy wiring that trips people up.</li>



<li>Setting up PostgreSQL row-level security correctly, with forced policies, a dedicated application role and pooling that doesn&#8217;t leak session state.</li>



<li>Building a tenant onboarding workflow that provisions identity, storage and tagging idempotently and verifies itself.</li>



<li>Writing the cross-tenant negative test suite and wiring it into CI so isolation regressions fail the build.</li>



<li>Adding per-tenant usage metering so cost, performance and tier decisions rest on data instead of guesses.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Send me a policy document, an RLS definition or a CloudTrail AccessDenied event and I&#8217;ll tell you what it&#8217;s actually enforcing.</p>



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</div>
<p>The post <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog/cloud-computing/tenant-isolation-aws-multi-tenant-saas/">Tenant Isolation on AWS: Building a Multi-Tenant Workshop Platform That Doesn&#8217;t Leak</a> appeared first on <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog">John Nessime</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Cognito MFA for Healthcare Apps: The Settings That Look Compliant but Aren&#8217;t</title>
		<link>https://john-nessime.com/blog/cloud-computing/cognito-mfa-healthcare-apps/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[John Nessime]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 30 Aug 2026 13:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cloud Computing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Web Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Account Recovery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Adaptive Authentication]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Audit Logging]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AWS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AWS Artifact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Business Associate Agreement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cloud Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cognito]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ePHI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Healthcare Cloud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HIPAA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Identity Propagation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MFA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OIDC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Passkeys]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PHI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Session Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TOTP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[WebAuthn]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://john-nessime.com/blog/?p=348</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A user pool set to "MFA: Required" can still let clinicians in on a password alone. This is a practical guide to Cognito MFA for healthcare apps: why federated users bypass enforcement, how the account recovery collision locks people out, why required MFA and adaptive authentication cannot coexist, and how to make session lifetimes match what your documentation claims.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog/cloud-computing/cognito-mfa-healthcare-apps/">Cognito MFA for Healthcare Apps: The Settings That Look Compliant but Aren&#8217;t</a> appeared first on <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog">John Nessime</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The finding came back from a penetration test on a patient portal: the tester signed in as a clinical user with nothing but a username and password. No second factor. No prompt. Straight into a screen with appointment history on it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The user pool was set to <code>MFA: Required</code>. Somebody had screenshotted that console page for the security questionnaire. The screenshot was accurate. It just didn&#8217;t mean what everyone assumed it meant.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That gap is the whole problem with Cognito MFA for healthcare apps. The service gives you a setting that reads like a guarantee, and then quietly carves out entire classes of users, sessions, and sign-in paths that the setting never touches. Nothing errors. Nothing logs a warning. Your compliance evidence looks fine right up until someone actually tests it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This post covers what the MFA switch in Amazon Cognito actually controls, the five failure families that show up in real healthcare deployments, how to wire a user pool so the enforcement matches the claim, and what to check when a clinician calls the help desk because they can&#8217;t get in.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What HIPAA actually requires from MFA right now</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Worth getting this straight before touching any configuration, because a lot of vendor content is confidently wrong about it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The HIPAA Security Rule as it stands today does not name multi-factor authentication. It requires person or entity authentication, and it leaves the mechanism to your risk analysis. MFA is how most people satisfy that in practice, but the rule does not spell it out.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What changes the picture is the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that HHS published in the Federal Register on January 6, 2025. It would make MFA an explicit requirement for access to systems handling ePHI, with narrow exceptions, and it would remove the &#8220;addressable&#8221; escape hatch that currently lets organizations document a control as infeasible. This one matters enough to name the date, because timelines have moved: the comment period closed in March 2025, the rule is still proposed, and the Unified Agenda has pushed anticipated final action out to 2027. That estimate is not binding and has already slipped once.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Practical read: build for the proposed rule now, but don&#8217;t tell a client the mandate is already law. It isn&#8217;t, and auditors know the difference.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On the AWS side, Amazon Cognito is on the HIPAA Eligible Services list and is covered by the AWS Business Associate Agreement. Eligibility is a starting line, not a finish line. You still have to accept the BAA in each AWS account that touches PHI, and you still have to configure the service correctly. Nothing about creating a user pool makes it compliant.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Failure family one: half your users never see the MFA prompt</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is the one that produced the pen test finding, and it&#8217;s the most common serious gap I run into.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cognito user pool MFA applies to <em>local</em> users. Those are the accounts that live in the user pool directory and authenticate against it. For <em>federated</em> users, the ones arriving through SAML or OIDC from a hospital identity provider, Okta, Entra ID, or an in-house ADFS, Cognito hands the entire authentication decision to the upstream IdP. It does not add a second factor. It cannot. It never sees the password.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So a portal with patients as local users and staff federated from a hospital directory has exactly the split you&#8217;d fear: patients get MFA, clinicians don&#8217;t, unless the hospital IdP is enforcing it independently. And the hospital IdP is usually somebody else&#8217;s system, run by a team you don&#8217;t have a Slack channel with.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There&#8217;s a second version of this. The app client, not the user pool, controls which authentication flows are permitted. If a legacy mobile client is still allowed to use a flow you thought you&#8217;d retired, that path stays open regardless of what the pool-level MFA setting says.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What to do about it:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>Inventory every app client attached to the pool. Not the ones you remember creating. Run <code>list-user-pool-clients</code> and account for all of them.</li><li>For each federated IdP, get written confirmation of what the upstream enforces. A trust relationship is not a control. Put the answer in your risk analysis where an auditor will find it.</li><li>Treat federation as a boundary you inherit risk across, and say so out loud in design reviews. This is the single most useful sentence you can contribute to a healthcare identity project.</li></ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Failure family two: the recovery attribute collision</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This one is genuinely subtle, and it doesn&#8217;t bite during development. It bites during rollout, at scale, to the people least able to tolerate it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cognito refuses to let a user&#8217;s MFA delivery method be the same channel as their account recovery method. The logic is sound: if a password reset code and a second factor both land in the same inbox, an attacker with that inbox has everything, and the second factor is decoration.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The consequence is where it gets sharp. If MFA is required, a user has only an email address and no phone number, email is your account recovery channel, and they have not registered a TOTP authenticator, then that user <strong>cannot complete sign-in at all</strong>. Cognito returns an error. They are not locked out temporarily. There is no path forward from the login screen.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Now think about who that describes in a healthcare deployment. Part-time nursing staff enrolled from an HR export that had work email but no mobile number. Older patients who gave an email at registration and nothing else. Contractors. Locums. It is never a small number, and they all arrive at the help desk in the same week.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The same rule cuts the other way on password reset. A user whose preferred MFA is email cannot receive a reset code by email. If they have no phone number, self-service recovery is gone, and someone with administrative credentials has to intervene for every single one.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Three ways out, in the order I&#8217;d reach for them:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li><strong>Make TOTP the default factor.</strong> An authenticator app doesn&#8217;t consume either the email or phone attribute, so the collision never occurs. This is the one I reach for first in staff-facing apps.</li><li><strong>Require both email and phone_number as sign-up attributes.</strong> When a user has both, Cognito automatically routes reset codes to whichever channel isn&#8217;t their MFA factor. Clean, but it forces a phone number on people who may not want to give one.</li><li><strong>Configure a recovery fallback.</strong> Set account recovery to prefer email but fall back to SMS, so users who aren&#8217;t eligible for email recovery still have a route.</li></ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Whatever you choose, run a query against your existing user records for accounts missing a phone number before you flip MFA to required. Finding those users in a report is cheap. Finding them through a help desk queue is not.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Failure family three: required MFA and adaptive authentication are mutually exclusive</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This trips up almost every security-conscious design I review, because both features are things a healthcare client will ask for by name.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cognito&#8217;s threat protection includes adaptive authentication: risk scoring on each sign-in, with automated responses like requiring MFA or blocking outright. To use those automated responses in full-function mode, <strong>MFA must be set to optional in the user pool</strong>. That is a documented constraint, not a bug. The mechanism only makes sense if there&#8217;s a state where MFA is not already being demanded.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">So you cannot check both boxes. Either MFA is required for everyone and adaptive responses have nothing to escalate to, or MFA is optional and risk scoring can escalate, which means low-risk sign-ins may proceed on a password alone.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For anything touching ePHI, I&#8217;d take required MFA and give up the adaptive escalation. A control that always applies beats a control that usually applies, and &#8220;usually&#8221; is a hard thing to defend in an audit.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">You don&#8217;t have to give up the visibility, though. Threat protection runs in audit-only mode alongside required MFA. You still get risk signals, device fingerprinting, and compromised credential detection surfaced in CloudWatch and in the user event logs, without the enforcement conflict. That&#8217;s a genuinely good trade: enforcement from the required setting, detection from threat protection.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two things to know before you budget for it. Threat protection lives in the Plus feature tier, and audit-only mode is billed the same as full-function. There&#8217;s no free observation period. Export those events somewhere you&#8217;ll actually look at them, whether that&#8217;s a CloudWatch Logs destination feeding your SIEM, or a platform like Datadog or Grafana Cloud if that&#8217;s where your on-call already lives.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Failure family four: the session outlives the shift</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">MFA protects the moment of sign-in. It does nothing about the eight hours after it. In healthcare that gap is unusually expensive, because the workstation is shared, the browser stays open, and the next person to touch the keyboard is a different human being.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cognito&#8217;s defaults are built for consumer apps. Access and ID tokens last one hour. Refresh tokens last thirty days. Neither default is wrong in general and both are wrong for a clinical workstation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The ranges you have to work with:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>Access token and ID token: five minutes to one day, set per app client.</li><li>Refresh token: sixty minutes to ten years, set per app client. It cannot be shorter than the access token lifetime.</li></ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Now the part that catches people, and the reason I put this failure family on the list. <strong>If you use managed login, Cognito sets a browser session cookie valid for one hour.</strong> Setting your access token to fifteen minutes does not shorten the re-authentication window. During that hour the user&#8217;s session refreshes without presenting credentials again, because the cookie is still good. Teams configure short tokens, write &#8220;15-minute session timeout&#8221; in the security documentation, and the observable behavior is an hour.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second trap is revocation. Revoking a token, or a global sign-out, invalidates refresh tokens. It does not invalidate an access token that has already been issued. That token stays valid until it expires, and any API accepting it will keep accepting it. So the practical blast radius of a compromised session is your access token TTL, not the moment you clicked &#8220;sign out this user.&#8221;</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That&#8217;s the argument for short access tokens: it is the only lever that shortens the window between &#8220;we revoked access&#8221; and &#8220;access actually stopped.&#8221;</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code># Tighten an app client used by clinical staff.
# Access tokens live 15 minutes; refresh tokens expire at the end of a shift.
aws cognito-idp update-user-pool-client 
  --user-pool-id us-east-1_EXAMPLE 
  --client-id EXAMPLECLIENTID 
  --access-token-validity 15 
  --id-token-validity 15 
  --refresh-token-validity 9 
  --token-validity-units AccessToken=minutes,IdToken=minutes,RefreshToken=hours 
  --enable-token-revocation</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Refresh token rotation is worth turning on where your client can support it. Each refresh returns a new refresh token and invalidates the old one, so a stolen refresh token is usable once at most. Two caveats that bite in practice: rotation does not extend the original lifetime, so a nine-hour refresh token still dies nine hours after sign-in no matter how often it rotated, and app clients with rotation enabled cannot use the older <code>REFRESH_TOKEN_AUTH</code> flow. That second one has broken more than one mobile release. Rotation requires the Essentials tier or higher.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">None of this replaces workstation-level controls. Screen lock policy, OS session timeouts, and endpoint hardening tooling like the utilities from O&amp;O Software do work your identity layer cannot do from the outside. If staff reach the admin console remotely, a managed VPN such as NordLayer or Surfshark reduces network exposure, but be honest in your documentation about what that is. It is not an authentication control, and treating it as one is exactly the reasoning auditors push back on.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Failure family five: the factor you picked is phishable</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cognito offers SMS, email, and TOTP as second factors, plus passkeys as a first factor under specific conditions. They are not equivalent, and the console presents them as though they were.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>SMS</strong> is the weakest. SIM swap and SS7 interception are real, and an SMS code is trivially relayed through a phishing proxy. It has one genuine advantage worth naming: enrollment friction is near zero, and for elderly or low-technology-comfort patient populations that is not a small thing. An SMS factor that gets used beats a TOTP factor that gets abandoned. Just don&#8217;t put clinical staff behind it. There&#8217;s also an operational trap: if your account is in the Amazon SNS SMS sandbox in the relevant region, you must verify each destination number before delivery works, which turns a smooth rollout into a stalled one.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Email OTP</strong> is roughly SMS-equivalent in phishing resistance and worse if the mailbox is on the same laptop as the session you&#8217;re protecting. It needs the Essentials tier or higher and a configured Amazon SES sending identity. Useful as a fallback, weak as a primary.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>TOTP</strong> is the sensible default for staff. It&#8217;s phishable, the code can be relayed in real time by an attacker-in-the-middle, but it&#8217;s immune to SIM swap and it doesn&#8217;t collide with your account recovery channel. Any standard authenticator works. If your organization already uses a password manager with built-in TOTP, such as 1Password or Bitwarden, enrollment gets meaningfully easier, at the cost of both factors living in one vault. That&#8217;s a trade-off to make deliberately rather than by accident.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Passkeys</strong> are the only phishing-resistant option here, and their integration has a shape you need to understand. A passkey cannot be a second factor on top of a password in Cognito. It can satisfy the MFA requirement on its own, as a first factor, when you set <code>FactorConfiguration</code> to <code>MULTI_FACTOR_WITH_USER_VERIFICATION</code> in the pool&#8217;s WebAuthn configuration. The user verification step, biometric or device PIN, is what makes it count as multi-factor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That&#8217;s the path I&#8217;d push for privileged accounts: administrators, anyone with bulk record export, anyone who can change the pool configuration itself. Platform authenticators cover most staff; hardware keys like YubiKey are worth the cost for the handful of accounts whose compromise ends the conversation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One hard constraint to plan around: you cannot set MFA to required in a pool that allows email or SMS one-time passwords as a <em>first</em> factor. Passwordless OTP sign-in and required MFA are incompatible. Passkeys with user verification are the documented exception.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Wiring up Cognito MFA for healthcare apps</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">An order of operations that avoids locking people out. Do this in a non-production pool first, with synthetic users only.</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list"><li><strong>Accept the BAA</strong> in the AWS account through AWS Artifact, before any real user data lands in the pool. The BAA is per-account and is not inherited by new accounts.</li><li><strong>Audit your user records</strong> for accounts missing <code>phone_number</code> or <code>email</code>. This is the population that will fail after you enable required MFA.</li><li><strong>Decide the recovery configuration</strong> and set it explicitly, with a fallback channel, so the MFA factor and the recovery channel can never be the same for any user.</li><li><strong>Enable MFA methods with the pool set to optional first.</strong> Let users enroll voluntarily. Track enrollment coverage as a number you report weekly.</li><li><strong>Flip to required only when coverage is high</strong> and the stragglers have a support path. Managed login will prompt unenrolled users to set up a factor at next sign-in, but only when MFA is required.</li><li><strong>Tighten token lifetimes per app client</strong>, then verify the observable behavior rather than the configuration. If you use managed login, remember the one-hour cookie.</li><li><strong>Turn on threat protection in audit-only mode</strong> and stream the events out to wherever you review security signal.</li></ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The core enforcement setting, once you&#8217;re ready:</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code># Require MFA pool-wide, TOTP as the available method.
aws cognito-idp set-user-pool-mfa-config 
  --user-pool-id us-east-1_EXAMPLE 
  --mfa-configuration ON 
  --software-token-mfa-configuration Enabled=true

# Set a specific user's preferred factor administratively.
aws cognito-idp admin-set-user-mfa-preference 
  --user-pool-id us-east-1_EXAMPLE 
  --username clinician@example.org 
  --software-token-mfa-settings Enabled=true,PreferredMfa=true</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Note that <code>admin-set-user-mfa-preference</code> does not reset an existing TOTP registration. To issue a new authenticator secret for a user who lost their phone, you go through <code>AssociateSoftwareToken</code> and <code>VerifySoftwareToken</code>. Build that runbook before you need it, because you will need it, and improvising an identity-proofing procedure at 2pm on a Tuesday is how bad help desk habits start.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A staging pool holding only synthetic patients doesn&#8217;t need to live inside the BAA account, and there&#8217;s no reason a test environment should carry production&#8217;s cost structure. A plain VPS from InterServer or Contabo is fine for the app tier in front of a throwaway pool, provided you are certain no real PHI can reach it. That certainty is the whole condition, and it&#8217;s worth writing down rather than assuming.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Troubleshooting</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">A user gets an error at sign-in and never reaches an MFA prompt</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Almost always the recovery collision. Check whether the account has both <code>email</code> and <code>phone_number</code>, and compare the populated attribute against the pool&#8217;s account recovery setting. If the only available attribute is also the recovery channel, and there&#8217;s no TOTP registration, the user has no eligible factor. Register TOTP for them or add the missing attribute.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Sign-in succeeds without MFA even though the pool says required</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Work backward from the user, not from the pool. Is this a federated user? Then Cognito is not in the authentication path and pool MFA does not apply. Is it their first sign-in after account creation? Cognito treats the initial verification message as the second factor on that first sign-in and prompts for factor registration afterward. Is a different app client involved with different permitted flows?</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Password reset stopped working after enabling MFA</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Expected behavior, not a regression. The reset code cannot go to the same channel as the user&#8217;s MFA factor. Users with only one contact attribute lose self-service recovery. Add the second attribute or configure a fallback recovery mechanism.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">SMS codes never arrive</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Check the Amazon SNS SMS sandbox status in the region holding your SNS resources. In the sandbox, destination numbers must be verified in SNS before delivery. Also confirm the IAM role Cognito assumes for SNS is present and correctly scoped.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Repeated MFA failures lock a user out</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">After five unsuccessful MFA code attempts, Cognito starts an exponential timeout lockout. It resolves on its own. Most real cases are clock drift on the user&#8217;s phone breaking TOTP validation, so check that before assuming an attack.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Tokens keep working after you revoked them</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Correct and by design. Revocation kills refresh tokens; already-issued access tokens survive to their expiry. If that window is unacceptable for your risk profile, shorten the access token TTL. There is no other lever short of checking revocation on every API call.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Common mistakes</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>Treating the pool-level MFA setting as coverage for federated users. It is not, and this is the gap most likely to survive to production.</li><li>Storing PHI in Cognito custom attributes. Diagnosis codes, MRNs, and care team assignments do not belong in a directory record that gets copied into ID token claims, which then land in browser storage, proxy logs, and error reports. Keep the identity layer to identity.</li><li>Enabling required MFA in one deploy without an enrollment ramp. You will manufacture a support incident.</li><li>Assuming a short access token gives a short session when managed login is in play. The one-hour cookie governs re-authentication.</li><li>Believing revocation is immediate.</li><li>Leaving threat protection off because required MFA is on. Audit mode and required MFA coexist, and the detection signal is separately valuable.</li><li>Enabling refresh token rotation without checking whether your client uses <code>REFRESH_TOKEN_AUTH</code>. That combination is not permitted and it breaks at runtime.</li></ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Best practices</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>Separate app clients for patient-facing and staff-facing applications, with independently tuned token lifetimes. Staff sessions should not inherit consumer defaults.</li><li>TOTP as the baseline factor for anyone with access to more than their own record.</li><li>Passkeys with user verification for administrators and bulk-export roles.</li><li>Both <code>email</code> and <code>phone_number</code> collected at enrollment where the population allows it, purely to keep recovery working.</li><li>Access token TTL short enough that revocation means something. Fifteen minutes is a reasonable starting point for clinical apps.</li><li>Threat protection in audit mode, with events exported and actually reviewed.</li><li>Manage the pool in Terraform or OpenTofu so MFA settings, recovery configuration, and token lifetimes are reviewable in a diff instead of discovered in the console during an audit.</li><li>Test the MFA path in CI against a non-production pool. Configuration drift in an identity provider is silent by nature.</li></ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">FAQ</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Is Amazon Cognito HIPAA compliant?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">No service is HIPAA compliant by itself. Cognito is HIPAA <em>eligible</em> and covered under the AWS Business Associate Agreement, which means you may process PHI with it once you have accepted the BAA in that account and configured it appropriately. Compliance is a property of your whole system and your documentation, not of the service.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Does HIPAA require MFA today?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Not explicitly. The current Security Rule requires person or entity authentication and leaves the method to your risk analysis. The proposed 2025 update would make MFA an express requirement, but it remains proposed and the timeline for final action has moved more than once.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Can I use required MFA and adaptive authentication together?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Not in full-function mode. Adaptive authentication&#8217;s automated responses require MFA to be optional in the user pool. You can run threat protection in audit-only mode alongside required MFA, which keeps the detection signal without the conflict.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Which MFA factor should healthcare apps use?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">TOTP as the baseline for staff, passkeys with user verification for privileged accounts. SMS is defensible for patient populations where enrollment friction genuinely determines whether MFA gets used at all, but it should not protect clinical access.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Does Cognito MFA apply to users signing in through our hospital SSO?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">No. For federated users arriving via SAML or OIDC, Cognito delegates authentication entirely to the upstream identity provider and does not add a second factor. Enforcement has to happen at the IdP, and you should get that in writing.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">How short should session timeouts be for a clinical application?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Set access tokens short, commonly around fifteen minutes, and refresh tokens to roughly a shift length rather than the thirty-day default. Then verify what users actually experience, because managed login&#8217;s one-hour browser cookie can keep a session alive past your token settings.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Can I store patient identifiers in Cognito user attributes?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">You can, and I would avoid it. Custom attributes flow into ID token claims, which end up in browser storage, application logs, and error tracking. Keep an opaque internal identifier in the token and resolve clinical data from your application database behind its own authorization check.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Conclusion</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If you remember one thing about Cognito MFA for healthcare apps, make it this: the MFA setting is a claim about local users at the moment of sign-in, and nothing else. It says nothing about your federated clinicians, nothing about the session that continues for the next eight hours, and nothing about whether the factor you chose survives a phishing proxy.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Verify enforcement by observing behavior, per user population, per app client. Not by screenshotting the console page. That screenshot is what got flagged in the pen test at the top of this post, and it was completely accurate.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Need help with Cognito and healthcare authentication?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">I work with teams building and hardening authentication on AWS, particularly where a compliance obligation makes &#8220;it works&#8221; insufficient. Things I can help with:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list"><li>Auditing an existing user pool for the gaps in this post: federated coverage, recovery collisions, token lifetimes, app client sprawl</li><li>Designing an MFA rollout that won&#8217;t generate a help desk queue, including the pre-flight query against your user records and the enrollment ramp</li><li>Implementing passkeys with user verification for privileged accounts, alongside TOTP for general staff</li><li>Moving user pool configuration into Terraform or OpenTofu so identity settings are reviewable and drift is visible</li><li>Wiring threat protection events into your existing monitoring and building the alerts that are worth waking someone for</li><li>Writing the technical evidence that maps your configuration to your risk analysis, in language an auditor accepts</li></ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If you have a user pool that isn&#8217;t behaving the way the console suggests it should, send me the output of <code>describe-user-pool</code> and <code>describe-user-pool-client</code> with the identifiers stripped, and I&#8217;ll tell you what I see.</p>



<div class="wp-block-buttons is-layout-flex wp-block-buttons-is-layout-flex">
<div class="wp-block-button"><a class="wp-block-button__link wp-element-button" href="https://www.upwork.com/freelancers/~01f15a912ad84a6620" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Work with me on Upwork</a></div>
</div>
<p>The post <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog/cloud-computing/cognito-mfa-healthcare-apps/">Cognito MFA for Healthcare Apps: The Settings That Look Compliant but Aren&#8217;t</a> appeared first on <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog">John Nessime</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Building a Salesforce AI Assistant on Amazon Bedrock Without Leaking Your CRM</title>
		<link>https://john-nessime.com/blog/devops/salesforce-ai-assistant-amazon-bedrock/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[John Nessime]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 18:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cloud Computing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DevOps]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Technical Guides]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AgentCore]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agentforce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Agents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Amazon Bedrock]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[API Gateway]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Architecture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AWS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bedrock Guardrails]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cloud Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cognito]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Data Integration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[External Client Apps]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Generative AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Identity Propagation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MCP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OAuth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rate Limiting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[REST API]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Salesforce]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://john-nessime.com/blog/?p=211</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The demo works, then someone sees records they shouldn't. Nothing errors. Here's how to build a Salesforce AI assistant with Amazon Bedrock that respects your sharing model: which doors AWS and Salesforce just closed, why identity propagation is the failure mode that bites, and how to shape the tool surface so the agent can't wander.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog/devops/salesforce-ai-assistant-amazon-bedrock/">Building a Salesforce AI Assistant on Amazon Bedrock Without Leaking Your CRM</a> appeared first on <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog">John Nessime</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The demo went fine. Someone from the support team asked the assistant which accounts looked at risk this quarter, and it answered. Good answer, too. Right opportunities, right open cases, sensible summary.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Then somebody noticed that the person who asked couldn&#8217;t see half those opportunities in the Salesforce UI. Different role, different branch of the hierarchy. They saw them through the assistant.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Nothing errored. No 403, no exception in the logs, no alert. The integration user had access, so the API call succeeded, so the model got the records, so it summarised them. Every layer did exactly what it was configured to do. That is the failure mode that should worry you most when you build a Salesforce AI assistant with Amazon Bedrock: it is silent, it is correct-looking, and you will not find it in a load test.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This post covers what actually goes wrong when you wire a large language model into a CRM: which door AWS closed on the entry path, whose permissions your agent is really running under, how to shape the tool surface so the model can&#8217;t wander, and what happens to your org&#8217;s API budget when an agent starts looping. There&#8217;s a build walkthrough, but the build is the easy part.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Two doors closed while you were reading the old tutorial</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Most of what ranks for this topic was written against an architecture you can no longer build in a fresh account. Both vendors changed the front door within a few months of each other, and the tutorials haven&#8217;t caught up. Check this before you follow anything, including this post.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">On the AWS side: Bedrock Agents is now Bedrock Agents Classic</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">AWS renamed the original Bedrock Agents service to Bedrock Agents Classic and put it into maintenance mode. It stopped accepting new customers on 30 July 2026. This one is worth stating with the date attached, because the date is the whole point.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The mechanics matter more than the branding:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Only <code>CreateAgent</code> and <code>InvokeInlineAgent</code> are restricted. Every other API stays available to everyone.</li>

<li>Allowlisting is per AWS account, based on whether that account used Bedrock Agents in the previous twelve months. Multi-account estates get a split result: your old sandbox works, your new production account doesn&#8217;t.</li>

<li>A non-allowlisted account calling <code>CreateAgent</code> gets an <code>AccessDeniedException</code> with HTTP 403, not a quota error. If you&#8217;re debugging IAM and seeing 403s, this is a plausible cause that no policy change will fix.</li>

<li>There is no exception process. AWS documents this plainly.</li>

<li>The model catalogue inside Classic is frozen. Bedrock itself keeps getting new models; the Classic orchestration layer does not.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The replacement is Amazon Bedrock AgentCore. It splits into a managed harness (config-driven, closest to the old experience) and code-defined agents on the AgentCore runtime (bring Strands, LangGraph, CrewAI, or your own loop). For a Salesforce assistant, the harness is usually enough, and you can move to code later without re-plumbing the tools.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Existing Classic agents keep running. There&#8217;s no announced end-of-life. But a frozen model catalogue sets a ceiling on the thing, and if your team can&#8217;t recreate the agent in a new account, your disaster recovery story has a hole in it.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">On the Salesforce side: Connected Apps gave way to External Client Apps</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Salesforce blocked creation of new Connected Apps through both UI and API, with package installation as the exception. External Client Apps are the replacement. Existing Connected Apps keep working and keep their OAuth flows, so this is a wall on new creation rather than a sunset.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The practical symptom is that the <em>New Connected App</em> button is greyed out with no explanation. Every AWS-to-Salesforce tutorial that opens with &#8220;first, create a Connected App&#8221; stops working right there.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One difference matters for agent work specifically: External Client Apps do not support the username-password OAuth flow at all. If your integration design assumed you&#8217;d stash a service account username and password somewhere and call it a day, that design is gone. Which is a good thing, and it forces the question the next section is about.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Failure family one: whose permissions is the assistant using?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This is the one from the opening, and it&#8217;s the reason most of these projects should slow down before they ship.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Salesforce&#8217;s security model is genuinely good. An OAuth token runs in a user context, and object permissions, field-level security, and sharing rules all still apply to API calls. A token with the <code>api</code> scope does not bypass CRUD, FLS, or sharing. People hear that and relax.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The catch is the phrase &#8220;a user context.&#8221; Which user?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If you authenticate the gateway to Salesforce with client credentials, every request from every person runs as one integration user. Salesforce enforces that user&#8217;s permissions perfectly. It has no idea a different human asked the question. You&#8217;ve built what&#8217;s sometimes called a multiplexor: one licence fronting many people, with all the real access control now living in your application layer instead of the platform&#8217;s.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">At that point the sharing model is decoration. A prompt that talks the model into calling a query tool with a wider filter returns data the asker was never entitled to, and Salesforce logs it as a legitimate read by a legitimate user. There&#8217;s nothing to alert on, because nothing went wrong.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Two-legged versus three-legged, and when each is honest</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">AgentCore Gateway supports both client credentials (two-legged) and authorization code (three-legged) flows for reaching downstream targets, and handles ingress and egress authorisation separately. That distinction is the control you need.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Two-legged is honest when the data is genuinely org-wide.</strong> Product catalogues, published knowledge articles, case deflection content. Nobody&#8217;s entitlement varies, so a single service identity represents the truth.</li>

<li><strong>Three-legged is the only correct answer for record data.</strong> Opportunities, accounts, contacts, custom objects with sharing rules on them. The token is minted for the actual human, Salesforce applies their sharing, and the answer is bounded by what they could have looked up themselves.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Three-legged costs you something real, and I&#8217;d rather say so than pretend it&#8217;s free. You need per-user consent, token storage, refresh handling, and a way to deal with a user whose token has expired mid-conversation. AgentCore Identity provides a token vault and handles the consent flow, including binding the authorisation URL to the session that started it so a shared link can&#8217;t be completed by someone else. It&#8217;s still more moving parts than a single secret in Secrets Manager.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Pay the cost anyway for record data. The alternative is a system whose blast radius is &#8220;everything the integration user can see,&#8221; discovered by a customer or an auditor rather than by you.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If you already run Okta, Auth0, or Ping as your identity provider, Gateway can sit in front of them for inbound auth rather than you standing up a parallel Cognito user pool. Reusing the IdP you already audit is worth more here than saving a config file.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Failure family two: the shape of the tool surface</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The second mistake is giving the model a tool called <code>run_soql</code> that accepts an arbitrary query string. It demos beautifully. Ask anything, get anything.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">You&#8217;ve now made the model your query planner and your authorisation layer at once. Every safety property of the system depends on prompt text. Guardrails help with content, not with whether a generated <code>WHERE</code> clause happened to be too generous.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Narrow tools are the fix, and they&#8217;re boring on purpose. <code>get_open_cases_for_account(account_id)</code> beats <code>run_soql(query)</code> because the query shape is fixed in your code, the model only supplies an identifier, and you can log and rate-limit each tool independently. When something goes wrong you&#8217;re reading a parameter, not parsing SOQL to work out what the model asked for.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">AgentCore Gateway takes OpenAPI specs, Smithy models, and Lambda functions as tool input types, and exposes them to the agent as MCP tools. It also has one-click integrations for several SaaS products including Salesforce. Practically that gives you three routes:</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>The built-in Salesforce integration</strong> for the fastest path to something working. Good for a proof of concept. Look closely at which operations it exposes before you take it further, because breadth is exactly what you don&#8217;t want.</li>

<li><strong>An OpenAPI target</strong> describing a small purpose-built API in front of Salesforce. This is the one I reach for first. You control the surface completely, and the spec doubles as the tool description the model reads.</li>

<li><strong>Lambda targets</strong> when a tool needs to combine several Salesforce calls, or talk to something else at the same time.</li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">MCP server targets are also supported, with the gateway aggregating tools from multiple targets into a single <code>tools/list</code> response. If you&#8217;re running your own MCP server as the Salesforce facade, it needs a stable HTTPS endpoint the gateway can reach; a small VPS from a provider like InterServer or Hetzner is plenty for the development and staging copies, with the production one behind whatever your standard ingress is.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Failure family three: the write path</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Reads leak. Writes destroy. They deserve different treatment and usually get the same treatment, which is how you end up with three hundred opportunities silently restaged.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Start read-only and stay there longer than feels necessary. When you do add writes, the constraints that actually help:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>One record per call.</strong> No bulk update tool. If the model wants to change twenty records it makes twenty calls, each individually logged and individually rate-limited. Slow is a feature here.</li>

<li><strong>Separate the write identity.</strong> A distinct External Client App and permission set for writes means you can revoke the write path at 2am without taking the assistant offline.</li>

<li><strong>Human confirmation on anything irreversible.</strong> The AgentCore harness supports inline function tools that pause the agent and hand control back to your client code, equivalent to return-of-control. That pause is where a person says yes.</li>

<li><strong>Stamp the source.</strong> A custom field recording that a change came from the assistant, with the session and actor ID, is the difference between a ten-minute rollback and an afternoon of forensics.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Salesforce field history tracking is on a limited number of fields per object. If the field your assistant writes to isn&#8217;t tracked, you have no before-value. Check that before go-live, not after.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Failure family four: what happens under load</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Salesforce meters API requests against a daily org-wide allocation that depends on your edition and licence count. Your assistant does not consume that budget the way a nightly sync does.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A single conversational turn can be several tool calls. A model that doesn&#8217;t get a clean answer will often retry with a different filter. Ten support agents having ten conversations each becomes a request pattern nobody modelled, and the org-wide limit means the integration that breaks first might be your ETL job, your marketing platform, or your billing sync. Not the assistant. That&#8217;s what makes it hard to diagnose.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Three things that help, in order of how much they buy you:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Cap tool calls per session in your agent config, and return a clear message when the cap is hit rather than letting the loop run.</li>

<li>Cache anything org-wide and slow-moving. Picklist values, record type metadata, product catalogue. These are a surprising share of calls and almost never change mid-day.</li>

<li>Watch API usage as a leading indicator, not a post-mortem. Salesforce exposes remaining daily requests via the REST limits resource. Scrape it on a schedule into CloudWatch, Grafana Cloud, or whatever you already page from, and alert on the trend rather than the wall.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Wiring it up</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">With the design decisions settled, the build is short. The AgentCore CLI scaffolds and deploys the harness.</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Create an External Client App in Salesforce with the narrowest OAuth scopes the tools need. Assign it via permission set, not profile.</li>

<li>Build the tool layer: an OpenAPI spec for your purpose-built endpoints, or Lambda functions for composite operations.</li>

<li>Create an AgentCore Gateway, attach the target, and configure the credential provider in AgentCore Identity for the egress side.</li>

<li>Create the harness, point it at the gateway, and deploy.</li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Scaffolding a harness and attaching a gateway looks like this. The <code>--gateway-arn</code> value is the gateway you created in step three, and the <code>--type</code> tells the CLI this tool is a gateway rather than one of the built-in tools such as the browser or code interpreter:</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code>agentcore create --name sf-assistant

agentcore add tool --harness sf-assistant 
  --type agentcore_gateway --name sf-gateway 
  --gateway-arn arn:aws:bedrock-agentcore:REGION:ACCOUNT_ID:gateway/GATEWAY_ID</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Then declare the model and the system prompt, and deploy. Check the current model identifiers in the Bedrock console rather than copying one from any blog post, this one included, because they change:</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code>agentcore add harness 
  --name sf-assistant 
  --model-id YOUR_MODEL_ID 
  --system-prompt "You answer questions about CRM records using only the provided tools. Never guess a record value." 
  --tools sf-gateway

agentcore deploy</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Invoking it takes a session ID, and an actor ID if you want memory scoped per user. Skipping <code>--actor-id</code> is the memory equivalent of the integration user problem: one shared memory store, everyone&#8217;s context in it.</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code>agentcore invoke --harness sf-assistant 
  --session-id "$(uuidgen)" --actor-id alice 
  "Which of my open opportunities have had no activity in three weeks?"</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Note &#8220;my&#8221; in that question. With three-legged auth it means something. With an integration user it means nothing, and the model will cheerfully invent a definition.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Troubleshooting</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong><code>AccessDeniedException</code> when creating an agent.</strong> If you&#8217;re calling <code>CreateAgent</code> or <code>InvokeInlineAgent</code> on the Classic API, check whether the account has prior Bedrock Agents usage before you touch IAM. No policy fixes this one. Build on AgentCore instead.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The New Connected App button is greyed out.</strong> Expected. Create an External Client App. If you have a documented technical requirement that only a Connected App satisfies, that&#8217;s a Salesforce Support request, not a setting you can toggle.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Tools appear in <code>tools/list</code> but calls fail.</strong> Gateway can cache tool schemas from a target without holding a working credential for calls. Discovery succeeding proves the schema synced, not that egress auth works. Look at the credential provider.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The assistant returns fewer records than the user expects.</strong> Under three-legged auth this is often correct behaviour that looks like a bug. Have the user run the same query in the Salesforce UI. If the UI shows more, check FLS on the specific fields; if it shows the same, the assistant is right and the user&#8217;s mental model is wrong.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Answers are confidently wrong about record values.</strong> Usually the model answering from training data instead of calling a tool. Tighten the system prompt to forbid answering record questions without a tool result, and check the traces to confirm which turns actually called out.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Everything works, then breaks at the same time daily.</strong> Look at org-wide API consumption before you look at your own code. Something else in the org may be eating the allocation on a schedule.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Common mistakes</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Using a System Administrator profile for the integration identity because it makes the errors go away.</li>

<li>Exposing a generic SOQL tool and calling the prompt a security control.</li>

<li>Testing only in a sandbox with one user, where the sharing model is invisible because there&#8217;s nothing to share.</li>

<li>Treating Guardrails as an access control layer. They filter content; they don&#8217;t know who&#8217;s asking.</li>

<li>Shipping writes in the first release because the read-only version felt underwhelming in the demo.</li>

<li>Building on Bedrock Agents Classic in a new account without checking allowlist status first.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Best practices</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Use three-legged OAuth for anything governed by sharing rules. Reserve client credentials for genuinely org-wide data.</li>

<li>Give each tool one job and a fixed query shape. The model supplies parameters, never structure.</li>

<li>Separate read and write identities so you can kill one without the other.</li>

<li>Scope memory per actor, not per deployment.</li>

<li>Test with at least three users at different levels of the role hierarchy, and diff the answers. Identical answers to &#8220;show me my pipeline&#8221; is the signal that identity isn&#8217;t propagating.</li>

<li>Keep end-to-end traces and ship them somewhere you already look, so agent behaviour lands in the same place as the rest of your telemetry.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Frequently asked questions</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Can I still use Bedrock Agents for a new Salesforce project?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Only if the AWS account already used Bedrock Agents in the previous twelve months. Accounts without that history get an <code>AccessDeniedException</code> on <code>CreateAgent</code>, and AWS has said there&#8217;s no exception process. For anything new, build on AgentCore.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Do I need Agentforce to build a Salesforce AI assistant with Amazon Bedrock?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">No. Agentforce is Salesforce&#8217;s own agent layer, and it can call out to AWS, which is useful when you want the assistant to live inside the Salesforce UI and inherit the Einstein Trust Layer. But an AgentCore agent calling Salesforce APIs through a gateway is a complete architecture on its own, and it&#8217;s the better fit when the assistant also needs to reach systems outside Salesforce.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Does the model see all my CRM data?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It sees whatever your tools return. That&#8217;s determined by the OAuth identity and the tool definitions, not by the model. This is why the identity decision matters more than the model choice.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Will Bedrock Guardrails stop the assistant leaking records?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">No, and this is worth being blunt about. Guardrails filter content categories and can mask sensitive data patterns. They have no concept of which user is asking or which records that user is entitled to. A record correctly retrieved under an over-permissioned token passes every guardrail check, because there&#8217;s nothing objectionable about it. Guardrails are a good layer. They are not this layer.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">How do I keep the assistant from burning the org&#8217;s API limit?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Cap tool calls per session, cache org-wide reference data, and monitor remaining daily requests via the REST limits resource on a schedule. The allocation is org-wide, so the symptom of overuse usually shows up in some other integration first.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Should I migrate an existing Bedrock Agents Classic setup?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There&#8217;s no deadline and no announced end-of-life, so there&#8217;s no emergency. The reasons to move are the frozen model catalogue and the fact that new accounts can&#8217;t recreate your agent. If you&#8217;re still actively developing the thing, move. If it&#8217;s stable and finished, it can wait. AWS publishes a capability mapping and a CLI import path for existing configurations.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Is an External Client App harder to set up than a Connected App?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Slightly different rather than harder. The main structural change is that developer settings and admin policies are separated, so the app definition and the per-org access controls are configured independently. The one real removal is the username-password flow, which no longer exists in the ECA model.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The one thing worth remembering</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A Salesforce AI assistant with Amazon Bedrock is not really a model problem. Model quality is the part that will take care of itself, and the part you can change with one config line later.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The part that won&#8217;t take care of itself is identity. If the assistant answers as one integration user, you have quietly moved your entire access control model from a platform that enforces it well into a prompt that enforces it not at all, and nothing in your monitoring will tell you. Get that right first. Then argue about models.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Need help building or auditing this?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Most of the work on these projects is unglamorous: deciding what the agent is allowed to touch, and proving it can&#8217;t touch anything else. That&#8217;s the part I&#8217;m useful for.</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Auditing an existing Salesforce AI integration for identity propagation gaps, including testing across role hierarchy levels to find silent over-permissioning.</li>

<li>Migrating a Bedrock Agents Classic deployment to AgentCore, including mapping action groups to gateway targets.</li>

<li>Designing the tool surface: replacing generic query tools with narrow, logged, individually rate-limited operations.</li>

<li>Setting up three-legged OAuth between AgentCore Gateway and Salesforce, including token vault and consent handling.</li>

<li>Moving integrations from Connected Apps to External Client Apps without breaking existing OAuth flows.</li>

<li>Instrumenting API consumption and agent traces so you see problems before an unrelated integration starts failing.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If you&#8217;ve got something concrete, send it over: a gateway target config, an agent trace, a tool schema, or just the error you&#8217;re stuck on. Easier to say something useful about a real setup than a hypothetical one.</p>



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<div class="wp-block-button"><a class="wp-block-button__link wp-element-button" href="https://www.upwork.com/freelancers/~01f15a912ad84a6620" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Work with me on Upwork</a></div>
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<p>The post <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog/devops/salesforce-ai-assistant-amazon-bedrock/">Building a Salesforce AI Assistant on Amazon Bedrock Without Leaking Your CRM</a> appeared first on <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog">John Nessime</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>AWS Amplify vs Firebase: Choosing a Backend You Can Still Leave</title>
		<link>https://john-nessime.com/blog/devops/aws-amplify-vs-firebase/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[John Nessime]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Aug 2026 13:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Architecture]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[AWS Amplify]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Cognito]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cost Optimization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deployment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DynamoDB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firebase]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firestore]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GraphQL]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Schema Design]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Serverless]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vendor Lock-In]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://john-nessime.com/blog/?p=177</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Both platforms look identical on day one: a schema file, a typed client, a deploy that works. The difference shows up months later, in the queries you cannot afford and the layer you cannot leave. A practical comparison of data models, billing shape, auth stickiness and exit cost.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog/devops/aws-amplify-vs-firebase/">AWS Amplify vs Firebase: Choosing a Backend You Can Still Leave</a> appeared first on <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog">John Nessime</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The ticket that ends the honeymoon usually looks harmless. Something like: <em>show me last quarter&#8217;s orders, grouped by region, filtered to three statuses, sorted by value</em>. Someone picks it up, opens the backend, and works out that there is no way to answer it without either pulling the whole collection down to the client or standing up a second database next to the first one.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That is the moment the <strong>AWS Amplify vs Firebase</strong> decision actually gets made. Not on day one, when both platforms look like a schema file, a typed client and a deploy that just works. On day two hundred, when the read path you committed to without noticing starts charging rent.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This post is a comparison, but not a feature tour. Both vendors publish good feature tables and neither of them is lying. What they do not tell you is which parts of the platform you can walk away from cheaply and which parts you are stuck with. So this is organised around the four things that decide that: the data model, the billing shape, the auth layer, and the exit cost.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The failure mode that bites: your read path is decided on day one</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both platforms hand you a pleasant abstraction over a NoSQL store. Firebase gives you Firestore, a document database. Amplify&#8217;s data layer, by default, gives you AppSync sitting in front of DynamoDB. In both cases you write a schema, get a typed client, and start shipping.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Here is what neither schema file makes obvious: it is not a description of your data. It is a bet on the queries you will need. Change the bet later and you are not editing a schema, you are backfilling.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Firestore, every query shape needs an index that supports it. Filter on two fields and sort on a third and you need a composite index. The console will helpfully offer to create it for you, which is why most teams never notice they are accumulating a per-query-shape index budget. There are no joins. If an order needs its customer&#8217;s name, either you denormalise the name into the order document or you do a second fetch per row.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In Amplify, relationships between models are resolved by AppSync, which usually means an extra round trip per relationship. Secondary indexes have to be declared in the schema so the underlying table can be built to serve them. Same constraint, different vocabulary.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The good news is that both vendors have finally admitted this is a problem. Firebase Data Connect puts a managed Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL instance behind a GraphQL schema and generates typed SDKs against it. On the AWS side, Amplify&#8217;s data layer can be pointed at a SQL database rather than DynamoDB, and the newer Blocks approach lets you compose Postgres and other capabilities into an existing Amplify backend. If your application has anything resembling reporting, joins or ad-hoc filtering in its future, start there rather than starting on documents and migrating under pressure.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">AWS Amplify: where it wins and where it doesn&#8217;t</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Amplify Gen 2 defines the whole backend in TypeScript. Auth, data, storage and functions all live as code in an <code>amplify/</code> directory, get reviewed in pull requests, and compile down through CDK to CloudFormation.</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code>// amplify/data/resource.ts
import { type ClientSchema, a, defineData } from '@aws-amplify/backend';

const schema = a.schema({
  Order: a
    .model({
      region: a.string().required(),
      status: a.enum(['PENDING', 'SHIPPED', 'CANCELLED']),
      total: a.float(),
    })
    .authorization((allow) =&gt; [allow.owner()]),
});

export type Schema = ClientSchema&lt;typeof schema&gt;;

export const data = defineData({ schema });</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Two things in that snippet matter more than they look. The <code>authorization</code> call is not a comment about intent, it generates the actual resolver-level access rules, so an access change is a code change with a diff. And <code>ClientSchema</code> flows the backend types into the frontend, which means removing a field breaks the build rather than breaking production at 3am.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Development happens in a per-developer cloud sandbox. It watches the <code>amplify/</code> folder and redeploys on save:</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code># Deploy and watch your own isolated backend stack
npx ampx sandbox

# Tear it down when you're finished - it is real infrastructure
npx ampx sandbox delete</code></pre>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Where Amplify wins</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>You are already on AWS.</strong> If your organisation has accounts, IAM boundaries, a VPC design and a compliance story, Amplify slots into all of it. Firebase would mean a second cloud to audit.</li>

<li><strong>The escape hatch is real.</strong> Because the backend compiles to CDK, you can drop into raw constructs and attach any AWS service without leaving the framework. That ceiling is much higher than Firebase&#8217;s.</li>

<li><strong>Environments are branches.</strong> Git branch to deployed environment is the native model, so staging is not a thing you build, it is a thing you push.</li>

<li><strong>Type safety end to end.</strong> This genuinely catches a class of bug that Firebase projects tend to find in production.</li>
</ul>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Where Amplify doesn&#8217;t</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Gen 1 is on a clock.</strong> Amplify Gen 1 is in maintenance mode and reaches end of life on 1 May 2027. This matters because a lot of the tutorials, Stack Overflow answers and agency codebases you will encounter are Gen 1, and Gen 1 to Gen 2 is a migration, not an upgrade. AWS ships tooling for it, but the guide describes a blue/green run with an irreversible refactor step. Budget for it properly.</li>

<li><strong>&#8220;Local&#8221; development is not local.</strong> The sandbox is a real CloudFormation stack in a real account. It is high fidelity, which is the point, but your inner loop now includes deploy time and your dev environment costs money.</li>

<li><strong>Errors surface as AWS errors.</strong> A mistake in a TypeScript schema can come back as a CloudFormation rollback referencing a resource you never named. Debugging Amplify means being comfortable reading AppSync, DynamoDB and CloudWatch.</li>

<li><strong>Smaller community.</strong> Fewer answers exist, and a meaningful share of the ones that do exist are for the previous generation.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Google Firebase: where it wins and where it doesn&#8217;t</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Firebase&#8217;s advantage is not that it is simpler. It is that the whole loop, from writing a rule to seeing a client behave, is shorter. The emulator suite runs the pieces on your machine:</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code># Run auth, Firestore and functions locally, no cloud project touched
firebase emulators:start --only auth,firestore,functions</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The thing you will spend the most time on is security rules, and it is worth understanding why they are shaped the way they are:</p>



<pre class="wp-block-code"><code>rules_version = '2';
service cloud.firestore {
  match /databases/{database}/documents {
    match /orders/{orderId} {
      allow read: if request.auth != null
                  &amp;&amp; request.auth.uid == resource.data.ownerUid;

      allow create: if request.auth != null
                    &amp;&amp; request.auth.uid == request.resource.data.ownerUid;

      allow update, delete: if false;
    }
  }
}</code></pre>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The distinction people get wrong is <code>resource.data</code> versus <code>request.resource.data</code>. The first is the document as it exists in the database, so it protects the read path. The second is the document the client is trying to write, so it protects the write path. Use the wrong one in a create rule and you are checking ownership on a document that does not exist yet, which evaluates to nothing and quietly lets the write through. That is the kind of bug that ships.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Where Firebase wins</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Mobile.</strong> Crashlytics, Cloud Messaging, Remote Config, A/B testing and analytics are one SDK away and genuinely good. AWS has equivalents, but not assembled like this.</li>

<li><strong>Offline and realtime.</strong> Firestore&#8217;s offline persistence and listener model handle flaky connectivity without you designing for it. If your users are on trains or in warehouses, this is a serious argument.</li>

<li><strong>Emulators.</strong> Being able to run the backend on a laptop, in CI, with no cloud project, is a real productivity difference against Amplify&#8217;s cloud sandbox.</li>

<li><strong>Time to first screen.</strong> For a prototype or an MVP that needs to exist by Friday, Firebase usually wins on speed alone.</li>
</ul>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Where Firebase doesn&#8217;t</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Configuration drifts out of git.</strong> The console is convenient and it is also a second source of truth. Indexes get created from an error link, a provider gets enabled by hand, and six months later nobody can rebuild the project from the repository. Terraform and the Firebase CLI both help, but you have to decide to use them.</li>

<li><strong>Security rules are a language, not a checkbox.</strong> They are also evaluated on the server for every access, which has cost implications when rules perform document lookups.</li>

<li><strong>Features you assume are included are an upgrade.</strong> Multi-factor auth, SAML and OIDC, blocking functions, audit logging and multi-tenancy live behind the Identity Platform upgrade, which comes with a different pricing model. On the free Spark plan, upgrading also introduces a daily active user cap. Find this out during design, not during an enterprise sales cycle.</li>

<li><strong>The ceiling is lower.</strong> When you outgrow Firebase you are usually moving to Google Cloud proper, which is a different set of tools and a different mental model.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What actually generates the bill</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Rates change, so treat published numbers as current-at-time-of-reading and go to the vendor pricing pages for the arithmetic. What is stable, and what you should actually reason about, is the <em>shape</em> of the meters.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Firestore charges per document, and the details are where teams get caught:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>A query that returns 200 documents is 200 reads, whether you use two fields from each one or forty.</li>

<li>A realtime listener is charged a read each time a document in its result set is added or updated. Attach a listener to a busy collection and you have built a meter that runs while nobody is looking at the screen.</li>

<li>Where your SDK exposes query offsets, skipped documents are still billed. Paginate with cursors, not offsets.</li>

<li>Aggregations such as <code>count()</code> are billed per batch of index entries read, with a minimum of one document read. Cheap, but not free, and not zero when you run them per page load.</li>

<li>Stored bytes include indexes and metadata, so index sprawl shows up twice: once in write amplification, once in storage.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Amplify has no single meter, because Amplify is not a service. The bill is assembled from AppSync (query and mutation operations, realtime update messages, and connection-minutes for open WebSockets), DynamoDB, Lambda invocations and duration, CloudWatch log ingestion and retention, Cognito monthly active users, and Amplify Hosting build minutes plus data served.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That difference is the practical one. Firebase gives you a bill you can read in the console in thirty seconds. AWS gives you eight line items that will not tell you which feature caused them unless you tagged resources properly on the way in. If you go the AWS route, set up cost allocation tags and a budget alarm before launch, not after the first invoice. Pushing CloudWatch metrics into <a href="https://grafana.com/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Grafana</a> alongside your application metrics is worth the afternoon it takes, because cost anomalies and traffic anomalies are usually the same incident viewed twice.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Auth is the component you cannot cheaply replace</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Firebase Authentication and Amazon Cognito are both fine. Neither is the reason to pick a platform. But auth is the layer where switching hurts most, because you are not migrating data, you are migrating <em>sessions and identities</em>, and every user notices.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both let you export users, including password hashes, so a migration is technically possible. What is hard is everything hanging off the user ID: rules that compare against it, resolver authorisation that assumes it, third-party integrations keyed on it, and support tooling that looks users up by it.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">One habit removes most of that pain regardless of which platform you pick: store your own internal user record from the first commit, with your own primary key, and treat the provider&#8217;s UID as an external identifier on that record. It costs you one table and one lookup. It converts an auth migration from a rewrite into a mapping exercise.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Hosting is the layer nobody should agonise over</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Amplify Hosting deploys from a git branch and supports server-rendered frameworks. Firebase now has two: the original Hosting for static sites, and App Hosting for modern server-rendered apps, which is generally available and runs on Cloud Run with Cloud CDN in front.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Both are good. Neither should influence your decision much, because hosting is the one layer with genuine competition and near-zero switching cost. A Next.js or Nuxt app moves to Vercel, Netlify, Cloudflare Pages or a container on a VPS from a provider like <a href="https://www.interserver.net/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">InterServer</a> or DigitalOcean in an afternoon. Put a CDN such as <a href="https://www.cloudflare.com/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Cloudflare</a> in front and the origin becomes an implementation detail your users never see.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Spend your deliberation budget on the data layer instead. That is where it pays.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Exit cost, ranked</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If you rank the layers by what it costs to leave, the ordering is the same on both platforms and it is the opposite of the ordering people use when choosing:</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Hosting.</strong> Swap it in a day. Barely counts as lock-in.</li>

<li><strong>Functions.</strong> Cloud Functions and Lambda handlers are mostly your own code with a different signature wrapped around it. A rewrite, but a bounded one.</li>

<li><strong>Auth.</strong> A user migration project with a communications plan attached.</li>

<li><strong>The data model.</strong> You do not migrate this. You rebuild the read path. Firestore&#8217;s managed export produces Firestore-format files in Cloud Storage, and DynamoDB exports to S3, and in both cases what lands is denormalised documents shaped by decisions you made two years ago, not a relational dataset you can point a reporting tool at.</li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">There is a fifth item with no clean export at all: realtime. Firestore listeners and AppSync subscriptions have no portable equivalent, so if realtime is core to your product, whichever you choose is close to permanent. That is not automatically an argument against either. It is an argument for knowing you are making that commitment when you make it.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">AWS Amplify vs Firebase: how I&#8217;d actually decide</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Not a scorecard. A procedure, in order, stopping at the first clear answer:</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Write down your three hardest read queries.</strong> Not the CRUD. The reporting screen, the search, the admin filter. If you cannot write them, you are not ready to choose a backend.</li>

<li><strong>Do any of them need joins, aggregates or filters you cannot predict?</strong> If yes, start relational: Firebase Data Connect, Amplify over a SQL data source, or plain Postgres behind an API you own. Do not start on documents planning to fix it later.</li>

<li><strong>Is this mobile-first with real offline requirements?</strong> Firebase, and it is not close.</li>

<li><strong>Does your organisation already run on AWS?</strong> Existing accounts, IAM, VPCs, audit posture and a security team who will ask questions about a second cloud all point to Amplify, even if Firebase would be faster this quarter.</li>

<li><strong>Who is maintaining this in two years?</strong> Amplify Gen 2 expects TypeScript fluency and some tolerance for CDK and CloudFormation. Firebase expects less. Match the platform to the team you will actually have.</li>

<li><strong>Any data residency or regulatory constraints?</strong> Check region availability for every service you plan to use, not just the headline one, before you commit.</li>

<li><strong>Still tied?</strong> It is a prototype. Pick the one your team can ship this week, and write down explicitly that the data model is the part you will have to revisit.</li>
</ol>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Mistakes I see repeatedly</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Choosing on SDK ergonomics.</strong> Both SDKs are pleasant. You are picking a data model and a billing model, and the SDK is the layer you would replace most easily.</li>

<li><strong>Building reporting on the transactional store.</strong> Both platforms punish this. Stream to a warehouse or a read replica and let the operational store do one job.</li>

<li><strong>Launching without a budget alarm.</strong> A missing <code>limit()</code>, a listener on a busy collection, or one post that gets traction can turn a hobby bill into a real one overnight. Set the alarm before you need it.</li>

<li><strong>Treating authorisation as a later task.</strong> On both platforms, access control is coupled to the data model. Retrofitting it usually means reshaping documents.</li>

<li><strong>Following Amplify Gen 1 material.</strong> The commands, the directives and the mental model are all different. Check which generation a tutorial targets before you follow it.</li>

<li><strong>Letting console clicks become infrastructure.</strong> Anything you enabled by hand is something you cannot rebuild. Get it into the CLI config or into Terraform.</li>

<li><strong>Assuming the free tier is the plan.</strong> It is a trial of the plan. Model your costs at ten times current traffic and see whether you still like the answer.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Frequently asked questions</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Is AWS Amplify or Firebase cheaper?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">It depends entirely on your access patterns, and anyone who answers this without seeing them is guessing. Firebase tends to be cheaper and far more predictable at small scale, partly because the free allowances are generous and partly because there is one meter to watch. AWS tends to win when you have steady, high-volume traffic and the engineering discipline to tune DynamoDB capacity and Lambda sizing. The bigger practical difference is legibility: a Firebase bill tells you what happened, an AWS bill tells you what was consumed.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Can I move from Firebase to AWS Amplify later?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Yes, but price it by layer rather than as one project. Hosting and functions move cheaply. Auth is a real migration with user impact. The data model is usually a rebuild rather than a move, because a Firestore export gives you denormalised documents, not a relational dataset. Teams that manage this well are the ones that kept business logic out of security rules and out of client code from the beginning.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Is Amplify Gen 1 still supported?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Gen 1 is in maintenance mode and reaches end of life on 1 May 2027. It receives critical fixes and security patches, not new features. If you are starting something new, use Gen 2. If you have a Gen 1 application in production, schedule the migration deliberately using the official tooling and guide, and test thoroughly before the refactor step, which is difficult to reverse.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Do I need Firebase Data Connect, or is Firestore enough?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Firestore is enough when your reads are predictable, mostly key-based, and denormalise cleanly. The moment you need joins, aggregates across collections, or filters that product will keep changing, Data Connect&#8217;s managed Postgres is the better foundation. It is also a lot easier to adopt at the start than to migrate onto after a year of document design.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Which one is better for a mobile app?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Firebase, in most cases. The offline persistence model, the crash reporting, the push messaging and the remote configuration are all mature and designed to work together. Amplify has mobile libraries and they work, but you are assembling the surrounding pieces from separate AWS services rather than getting them as a set.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">What about a self-hosted alternative?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Worth considering if lock-in is your main worry. Supabase and Appwrite both offer a comparable developer experience over Postgres, and either can run on your own infrastructure. Understand what you are taking on, though: backups, restore testing, upgrades, patching and monitoring all become yours. That is a real operational load, and it is the trade most teams are implicitly paying a managed vendor to avoid.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Can I use both together?</h3>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">You can, and some teams do run Firebase for analytics and messaging alongside an AWS backend. Be honest about the cost: two identity models, two billing accounts, two audit trails and two on-call runbooks. Do it because one platform is clearly better at a specific job, not because it was easier than making a decision.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The one thing worth remembering</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The <strong>AWS Amplify vs Firebase</strong> question is almost never settled by features, and it is never settled by which SDK feels nicer in a tutorial. Both platforms will get you to a working application quickly, and both will hold up in production for the workloads they were designed for.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">What separates them, months later, is the read path you committed to on day one and the layer you cannot afford to leave. Write down your three hardest queries before you write any schema. Decide whether you need relational storage while it is still a decision rather than a migration. Keep your own user record from the first commit. Set a budget alarm before launch.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Do those four things and either platform is a reasonable choice. Skip them and neither one saves you.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Need a second opinion before you commit?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Backend platform decisions are cheap to review and expensive to reverse. Things I help with in this area:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Reviewing a Firestore or DynamoDB data model against the queries you actually need, before the design hardens</li>

<li>Cost modelling both platforms against your real traffic assumptions, with the meters broken out so you can see what drives the bill</li>

<li>Amplify Gen 1 to Gen 2 migration planning, including the blue/green sequence and what to verify before the irreversible step</li>

<li>Auditing Firestore security rules and Amplify authorisation rules for gaps between the read path and the write path</li>

<li>Setting up cost allocation tags, budget alarms and CloudWatch or Grafana dashboards so a runaway query shows up in hours rather than on the invoice</li>

<li>Exit planning: working out what a migration off your current platform would genuinely cost, layer by layer</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">If you want a concrete answer rather than a general one, send me the thing itself: your schema file, your security rules, a screenshot of last month&#8217;s billing breakdown, or the three queries you are worried about. That is usually enough to tell you something useful.</p>



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<p>The post <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog/devops/aws-amplify-vs-firebase/">AWS Amplify vs Firebase: Choosing a Backend You Can Still Leave</a> appeared first on <a href="https://john-nessime.com/blog">John Nessime</a>.</p>
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